[29 Dec 2013] Iranian Billionaire Babak Zanjani subject of controversy -...
Babak Zanjani, Iranian billionaire topic of controversy in Iranian parliament. Twelve Iranian parliamentarians wrote a letter and asked the heads...
Babak Zanjani, Iranian billionaire topic of controversy in Iranian parliament. Twelve Iranian parliamentarians wrote a letter and asked the heads of the three branches of government to look into Babak Zanjani\\\'s case and accused him of corruption. Earlier in a press conference the head of Iran\\\'s Supreme Audit Court had talked about Zanjani.
Some parliamentarians agree that simply putting this much money at the disposal of one individual without any collateral is not right and President Ahmadinejad and his cabinet had better choices. Some other representatives believe that Zanjani is not alone The spokesman for Iranian Parliament\\\'s Legal and Judicial Commission. Esfenani, thinks that accusing any person before he or she is convicted in a court of law is illegal. Experts say Babak Zanjani\\\'s estimated net worth is around 13.8 billion dollars. Iranian judiciary officials say that there is no corruption case referred to it by the parliament\\\'s article 90 commission.
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[10 Feb 2014] The Debate - C.A.R. Catastrophe (P.2) - English
Since a December uprising by Christian militia, the minority Muslim community of the Central African Republic has been subject to sectarian...
Since a December uprising by Christian militia, the minority Muslim community of the Central African Republic has been subject to sectarian violence. Tens of thousands of Muslims are fleeing to neighboring countries by plane and truck as Christian militias stage brutal attacks, shattering the social fabric of this war-ravaged nation.
Human Rights Watch has warned the Muslim community will disappear if killings are not stopped. The brutalities began to escalate when the country\'s first Muslim leader, Michel Djotodia, stepped down and went into exile last month.
What is the root cause of the violence and what is the solution?
12m:39s
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[10 Feb 2014] The Debate - C.A.R. Catastrophe (P.1) - English
Since a December uprising by Christian militia, the minority Muslim community of the Central African Republic has been subject to sectarian...
Since a December uprising by Christian militia, the minority Muslim community of the Central African Republic has been subject to sectarian violence. Tens of thousands of Muslims are fleeing to neighboring countries by plane and truck as Christian militias stage brutal attacks, shattering the social fabric of this war-ravaged nation.
Human Rights Watch has warned the Muslim community will disappear if killings are not stopped. The brutalities began to escalate when the country\'s first Muslim leader, Michel Djotodia, stepped down and went into exile last month.
What is the root cause of the violence and what is the solution?
10m:35s
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[English Translation] Interview Bashar Al-Asad - President Syria on...
DAMASCUS, (SANA)-President Bashar al-Assad gave an interview to al-Manar TV broadcasted on Thursday,
Following is the full text of the...
DAMASCUS, (SANA)-President Bashar al-Assad gave an interview to al-Manar TV broadcasted on Thursday,
Following is the full text of the interview:
Al-Manar: In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Assalamu Alaikum. Bloodshed in Syria continues unabated. This is the only constant over which there is little disagreement between those loyal to the Syrian state and those opposed to it. However, there is no common ground over the other constants and details two years into the current crisis. At the time, a great deal was said about the imminent fall of the regime. Deadlines were set and missed; and all those bets were lost. Today, we are here in the heart of Damascus, enjoying the hospitality of a president who has become a source of consternation to many of his opponents who are still unable to understand the equations that have played havoc with their calculations and prevented his ouster from the Syrian political scene. This unpleasant and unexpected outcome for his opponents upset their schemes and plots because they didnât take into account one self-evident question: what happens if the regime doesnât fall? What if President Assad doesnât leave the Syrian scene? Of course, there are no clear answers; and the result is more destruction, killing and bloodshed. Today there is talk of a critical juncture for Syria. The Syrian Army has moved from defense to attack, achieving one success after another. On a parallel level, stagnant diplomatic waters have been shaken by discussions over a Geneva 2 conference becoming a recurrent theme in the statements of all parties. There are many questions which need answers: political settlement, resorting to the military option to decide the outcome, the Israeli enemyâs direct interference with the course of events in the current crisis, the new equations on the Golan Heights, the relationship with opponents and friends. What is the Syrian leadershipâs plan for a way out of a complex and dangerous crisis whose ramifications have started to spill over into neighboring countries? It is our great pleasure tonight to put these questions to H. E. President Bashar al-Assad. Assalamu Alaikum, Mr. President.
President Assad: Assalamu Alaikum. You are most welcome in Damascus.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, we are in the heart of the Peopleâs Palace, two and a half years into the Syrian crisis. At the time, the bet was that the president and his regime would be overthrown within weeks. How have you managed to foil the plots of your opponents and enemies? What is the secret behind this steadfastness?
President Assad: There are a number of factors are involved. One is the Syrian factor, which thwarted their intentions; the other factor is related to those who masterminded these scenarios and ended up defeating themselves because they do not know Syria or understand in detail the situation. They started with the calls of revolution, but a real revolution requires tangible elements; you cannot create a revolution simply by paying money. When this approach failed, they shifted to using sectarian slogans in order to create a division within our society. Even though they were able to infiltrate certain pockets in Syrian society, pockets of ignorance and lack of awareness that exist in any society, they were not able to create this sectarian division. Had they succeeded, Syria would have been divided up from the beginning. They also fell into their own trap by trying to promote the notion that this was a struggle to maintain power rather than a struggle for national sovereignty. No one would fight and martyr themselves in order to secure power for anyone else.
Al-Manar: In the battle for the homeland, it seems that the Syrian leadership, and after two and a half years, is making progress on the battlefield. And here if I might ask you, why have you chosen to move from defense to attack? And donât you think that you have been late in taking the decision to go on the offensive, and consequently incurred heavy losses, if we take of Al-Qseir as an example.
President Assad: It is not a question of defense or attack. Every battle has its own tactics. From the beginning, we did not deal with each situation from a military perspective alone. We also factored in the social and political aspects as well - many Syrians were misled in the beginning and there were many friendly countries that didnât understand the domestic dynamics. Your actions will differ according to how much consensus there is over a particular issue. There is no doubt that as events have unfolded Syrians have been able to better understand the situation and what is really at stake. This has helped the Armed Forces to better carry out their duties and achieve results. So, what is happening now is not a shift in tactic from defense to attack, but rather a shift in the balance of power in favor of the Armed Forces.
Al-Manar: How has this balance been tipped, Mr. President? Syria is being criticized for asking for the assistance of foreign fighters, and to be fully candid, it is said that Hezbollah fighters are extending assistance. In a previous interview, you said that there are 23 million Syrians; we do not need help from anyone else. What is Hezbollah doing in Syria?
President Assad: The main reason for tipping the balance is the change in peopleâs opinion in areas that used to incubate armed groups, not necessarily due to lack of patriotism on their part, but because they were deceived. They were led to believe that there was a revolution against the failings of the state. This has changed; many individuals have left these terrorist groups and have returned to their normal lives. As to what is being said about Hezbollah and the participation of foreign fighters alongside the Syrian Army, this is a hugely important issue and has several factors. Each of these factors should be clearly understood. Hezbollah, the battle at Al-Qseir and the recent Israeli airstrike â these three factors cannot be looked at in isolation of the other, they are all a part of the same issue. Letâs be frank. In recent weeks, and particularly after Mr. Hasan Nasrallahâs speech, Arab and foreign media have said that Hezbollah fighters are fighting in Syria and defending the Syrian state, or to use their words âthe regime.â Logically speaking, if Hezbollah or the resistance wanted to defend Syria by sending fighters, how many could they send - a few hundred, a thousand or two? We are talking about a battle in which hundreds of thousands of Syrian troops are involved against tens of thousands of terrorists, if not more because of the constant flow of fighters from neighboring and foreign countries that support those terrorists. So clearly, the number of fighters Hezbollah might contribute in order to defend the Syrian state in its battle, would be a drop in the ocean compared to the number of Syrian soldiers fighting the terrorists. When also taking into account the vast expanse of Syria, these numbers will neither protect a state nor âregime.â This is from one perspective. From another, if they say they are defending the state, why now? Battles started after Ramadan in 2011 and escalated into 2012, the summer of 2012 to be precise. They started the battle to âliberate Damascusâ and set a zero hour for the first time, the second time and a third time; the four generals were assassinated, a number of individuals fled Syria, and many people believed that was the time the state would collapse. It didnât. Nevertheless, during all of these times, Hezbollah never intervened, so why would it intervene now? More importantly, why havenât we seen Hezbollah fighting in Damascus and Aleppo? The more significant battles are in Damascus and in Aleppo, not in Al-Qseir. Al-Qseir is a small town in Homs, why havenât we seen Hezbollah in the city of Homs? Clearly, all these assumptions are inaccurate. They say Al-Qseir is a strategic border town, but all the borders are strategic for the terrorists in order to smuggle in their fighters and weapons. So, all these propositions have nothing to do with Hezbollah. If we take into account the moans and groans of the Arab media, the statements made by Arab and foreign officials â even Ban Ki-moon expressed concern over Hezbollah in Al-Qseir â all of this is for the objective of suppressing and stifling the resistance. It has nothing to do with defending the Syrian state. The Syrian army has made significant achievements in Damascus, Aleppo, rural Damascus and many other areas; however, we havenât heard the same moaning as we have heard in Al-Qseir.
Al-Manar: But, Mr. President, the nature of the battle that you and Hezbollah are waging in Al-Qseir seems, to your critics, to take the shape of a safe corridor connecting the coastal region with Damascus. Consequently, if Syria were to be divided, or if geographical changes were to be enforced, this would pave the way for an Alawite state. So, what is the nature of this battle, and how is it connected with the conflict with Israel.
President Assad: First, the Syrian and Lebanese coastal areas are not connected through Al-Qseir. Geographically this is not possible. Second, nobody would fight a battle in order to move towards separation. If you opt for separation, you move towards that objective without waging battles all over the country in order to be pushed into a particular corner. The nature of the battle does not indicate that we are heading for division, but rather the opposite, we are ensuring we remain a united country. Our forefathers rejected the idea of division when the French proposed this during their occupation of Syria because at the time they were very aware of its consequences. Is it possible or even fathomable that generations later, we their children, are less aware or mindful? Once again, the battle in Al-Qseir and all the bemoaning is related to Israel. The timing of the battle in Al-Qseir was synchronized with the Israeli airstrike. Their objective is to stifle the resistance. This is the same old campaign taking on a different form. Now whatâs important is not al-Qseir as a town, but the borders; they want to stifle the resistance from land and from the sea. Here the question begs itself - some have said that the resistance should face the enemy and consequently remain in the south. This was said on May 7, 2008, when some of Israelâs agents in Lebanon tried to tamper with the communications system of the resistance; they claimed that the resistance turned its weapons inwards. They said the same thing about the Syrian Army; that the Syrian Army should fight on the borders with Israel. We have said very clearly that our Army will fight the enemy wherever it is. When the enemy is in the north, we move north; the same applies if the enemy comes from the east or the west. This is also the case for Hezbollah. So the question is why is Hezbollah deployed on the borders inside Lebanon or inside Syria? The answer is that our battle is a battle against the Israeli enemy and its proxies inside Syria or inside Lebanon.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, if I might ask about Israelâs involvement in the Syrian crisis through the recent airstrike against Damascus. Israel immediately attached certain messages to this airstrike by saying it doesnât want escalation or doesnât intend to interfere in the Syrian crisis. The question is: what does Israel want and what type of interference?
President Assad: This is exactly my point. Everything that is happening at the moment is aimed, first and foremost, at stifling the resistance. Israelâs support of the terrorists was for two purposes. The first is to stifle the resistance; the second is to strike the Syrian air defense systems. It is not interested in anything else.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, since Israelâs objectives are clear, the Syrian state was criticized for its muted response. Everyone was expecting a Syrian response, and the Syrian government stated that it reserves the right to respond at the appropriate time and place. Why didnât the response come immediately? And is it enough for a senior source to say that missiles have been directed at the Israeli enemy and that any attack will be retaliated immediately without resorting to Army command?
President Assad: We have informed all the Arab and foreign parties - mostly foreign - that contacted us, that we will respond the next time. Of course, there has been more than one response. There have been several Israeli attempted violations to which there was immediate retaliation. But these short-term responses have no real value; they are only of a political nature. If we want to respond to Israel, the response will be of strategic significance.
Al-Manar: How? By opening the Golan front, for instance?
President Assad: This depends on public opinion, whether there is a consensus in support of the resistance or not. Thatâs the question. Al-Manar: How is the situation in Syria now?
President Assad: In fact, there is clear popular pressure to open the Golan front to resistance. This enthusiasm is also on the Arab level; we have received many Arab delegations wanting to know how young people might be enrolled to come and fight Israel. Of course, resistance is not easy. It is not merely a question of opening the front geographically. It is a political, ideological, and social issue, with the net result being military action.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, if we take into account the incident on the Golan Heights and Syriaâs retaliation on the Israeli military vehicle that crossed the combat line, does this mean that the rules of engagement have changed? And if the rules of the game have changed, what is the new equation, so to speak?
President Assad: Real change in the rules of engagement happens when there is a popular condition pushing for resistance. Any other change is short-term, unless we are heading towards war. Any response of any kind might only appear to be a change to the rules of engagement, but I donât think it really is. The real change is when the people move towards resistance; this is the really dramatic change.
Al-Manar: Donât you think that this is a little late? After 40 years of quiet and a state of truce on the Golan Heights, now there is talk of a movement on that front, about new equations and about new rules of the game?
President Assad: They always talk about Syria opening the front or closing the front. A state does not create resistance. Resistance can only be called so, when it is popular and spontaneous, it cannot be created. The state can either support or oppose the resistance, - or create obstacles, as is the case with some Arab countries. I believe that a state that opposes the will of its people for resistance is reckless. The issue is not that Syria has decided, after 40 years, to move in this direction. The publicâs state of mind is that our National Army is carrying out its duties to protect and liberate our land. Had there not been an army, as was the situation in Lebanon when the army and the state were divided during the civil war, there would have been resistance a long time ago. Today, in the current circumstances, there are a number of factors pushing in that direction. First, there are repeated Israeli aggressions that constitute a major factor in creating this desire and required incentive. Second, the armyâs engagement in battles in more than one place throughout Syria has created a sentiment on the part of many civilians that it is their duty to move in this direction in order to support the Armed Forces on the Golan.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel would not hesitate to attack Syria if it detected that weapons are being conveyed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Israel carried out its threats, I want a direct answer from you: what would Syria do?
President Assad: As I have said, we have informed the relevant states that we will respond in kind. Of course, it is difficult to specify the military means that would be used, that is for our military command to decide. We plan for different scenarios, depending on the circumstances and the timing of the strike that would determine which method or weapons.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, after the airstrike that targeted Damascus, there was talk about the S300 missiles and that this missile system will tip the balance. Based on this argument, Netanyahu visited Moscow. My direct question is this: are these missiles on their way to Damascus? Is Syria now in possession of these missiles?
President Assad: It is not our policy to talk publically about military issues in terms of what we possess or what we receive. As far as Russia is concerned, the contracts have nothing to do with the crisis. We have negotiated with them on different kinds of weapons for years, and Russia is committed to honoring these contracts. What I want to say is that neither Netanyahuâs visit nor the crisis and the conditions surrounding it have influenced arms imports. All of our agreements with Russia will be implemented, some have been implemented during the past period and, together with the Russians, we will continue to implement these contracts in the future.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, we have talked about the steadfastness of the Syrian leadership and the Syrian state. We have discussed the progress being achieved on the battlefield, and strengthening the alliance between Syria and the resistance. These are all within the same front. From another perspective, there is diplomatic activity stirring waters that have been stagnant for two and a half years. Before we talk about this and about the Geneva conference and the red lines that Syria has drawn, there was a simple proposition or a simple solution suggested by the former head of the coalition, Muaz al-Khatib. He said that the president, together with 500 other dignitaries would be allowed to leave the country within 20 days, and the crisis would be over. Why donât you meet this request and put an end to the crisis?
President Assad: I have always talked about the basic principle: that the Syrian people alone have the right to decide whether the president should remain or leave. So, anybody speaking on this subject should state which part of the Syrian people they represent and who granted them the authority to speak on their behalf. As for this initiative, I havenât actually read it, but I was very happy that they allowed me 20 days and 500 people! I donât know who proposed the initiative; I donât care much about names.
Al-Manar: He actually said that you would be given 20 days, 500 people, and no guarantees. Youâll be allowed to leave but with no guarantee whatsoever on whether legal action would be taken against you or not. Mr. President, this brings us to the negotiations, I am referring to Geneva 2. The Syrian government and leadership have announced initial agreement to take part in this conference. If this conference is held, there will be a table with the Syrian flag on one side and the flag of the opposition groups on the other. How can you convince the Syrian people after two and a half years of crisis that you will sit face to face at the same negotiating table with these groups?
President Assad: First of all, regarding the flag, it is meaningless without the people it represents. When we put a flag on a table or anywhere else, we talk about the people represented by that flag. This question can be put to those who raise flags they call Syrian but are different from the official Syrian flag. So, this flag has no value when it does not represent the people. Secondly, we will attend this conference as the official delegation and legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. But, whom do they represent? When the conference is over, we return to Syria, we return home to our people. But when the conference is over, whom do they return to - five-star hotels? Or to the foreign ministries of the states that they represent â which doesnât include Syria of course - in order to submit their reports? Or do they return to the intelligence services of those countries? So, when we attend this conference, we should know very clearly the positions of some of those sitting at the table - and I say some because the conference format is not clear yet and as such we do not have details as to how the patriotic Syrian opposition will be considered or the other opposition parties in Syria. As for the opposition groups abroad and their flag, we know that we are attending the conference not to negotiate with them, but rather with the states that back them; it will appear as though we are negotiating with the slaves, but essentially we are negotiating with their masters. This is the truth, we shouldnât deceive ourselves.
Al-Manar: Are you, in the Syrian leadership, convinced that these negotiations will be held next month?
President Assad: We expect them to happen, unless they are obstructed by other states. As far as we are concerned in Syria, we have announced a couple of days ago that we agree in principle to attend.
Al-Manar: When you say in principle, it seems that you are considering other options.
President Assad: In principle, we are in favour of the conference as a notion, but there are no details yet. For example, will there be conditions placed before the conference? If so, these conditions may be unacceptable and we would not attend. So the idea of the conference, of a meeting, in principle is a good one. We will have to wait and see.
Al-Manar: Letâs talk, Mr. President, about the conditions put by the Syrian leadership. What are Syriaâs conditions?
President Assad: Simply put, our only condition is that anything agreed upon in any meeting inside or outside the country, including the conference, is subject to the approval of the Syrian people through a popular referendum. This is the only condition. Anything else doesnât have any value. That is why we are comfortable with going to the conference. We have no complexes. Either side can propose anything, but nothing can be implemented without the approval of the Syrian people. And as long as we are the legitimate representatives of the people, we have nothing to fear.
Al-Manar: Letâs be clear, Mr. President. There is a lot of ambiguity in Geneva 1 and Geneva 2 about the transitional period and the role of President Bashar al-Assad in that transitional period. Are you prepared to hand over all your authorities to this transitional government? And how do you understand this ambiguous term?
President Assad: This is what I made clear in the initiative I proposed in January this year. They say they want a transitional government in which the president has no role. In Syria we have a presidential system, where the President is head of the republic and the Prime Minister heads the government. They want a government with broad authorities. The Syrian constitution gives the government full authorities. The president is the commander-in-chief of the Army and Armed Forces and the head of the Supreme Judicial Council. All the other institutions report directly to the government. Changing the authorities of the president is subject to changing the constitution; the president cannot just relinquish his authorities, he doesn\\\'t have the constitutional right. Changing the constitution requires a popular referendum. When they want to propose such issues, they might be discussed in the conference, and when we agree on something - if we agree, we return home and put it to a popular referendum and then move on. But for them to ask for the amendment of the constitution in advance, this cannot be done neither by the president nor by the government.
Al-Manar: Frankly, Mr. President, all the international positions taken against you and all your political opponents said that they donât want a role for al-Assad in Syriaâs future. This is what the Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal said and this is what the Turks and the Qataris said, and also the Syrian opposition. Will President Assad be nominated for the forthcoming presidential elections in 2014?
President Assad: What I know is that Saud al-Faisal is a specialist in American affairs, I donât know if he knows anything about Syrian affairs. If he wants to learn, thatâs fine! As to the desires of others, I repeat what I have said earlier: the only desires relevant are those of the Syrian people. With regards to the nomination, some parties have said that it is preferable that the president shouldnât be nominated for the 2014 elections. This issue will be determined closer to the time; it is still too early to discuss this. When the time comes, and I feel, through my meetings and interactions with the Syrian people, that there is a need and public desire for me to nominate myself, I will not hesitate. However, if I feel that the Syrian people do not want me to lead them, then naturally I will not put myself forward. They are wasting their time on such talk.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, you mentioned the Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal. This makes me ask about Syriaâs relationship with Saudi Arabia, with Qatar, with Turkey, particularly if we take into account that their recent position in the Arab ministerial committee was relatively moderate. They did not directly and publically call for the ouster of President Assad. Do you feel any change or any support on the part of these countries for a political solution to the Syrian crisis? And is Syria prepared to deal once more with the Arab League, taking into account that the Syrian government asked for an apology from the Arab League?
President Assad: Concerning the Arab states, we see brief changes in their rhetoric but not in their actions. The countries that support the terrorists have not changed; they are still supporting terrorism to the same extent. Turkey also has not made any positive steps. As for Qatar, their role is also the same, the role of the funder - the bank funding the terrorists and supporting them through Turkey. So, overall, no change. As for the Arab League, in Syria we have never pinned our hopes on the Arab League. Even in the past decades, we were barely able to dismantle the mines set for us in the different meetings, whether in the summits or in meetings of the foreign ministers. So in light of this and its recent actions, can we really expect it to play a role? We are open to everybody, we never close our doors. But we should also be realistic and face the truth that they are unable to offer anything, particularly since a significant number of the Arab states are not independent. They receive their orders from the outside. Some of them are sympathetic to us in their hearts, but they cannot act on their feelings because they are not in possession of their decisions. So, no, we do not pin any hopes on the Arab League.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, this leads us to ask: if the Arab environment is as such, and taking into account the developments on the ground and the steadfastness, the Geneva conference and the negotiations, the basic question is: what if the political negotiations fail? What are the consequences of the failure of political negotiations?
President Assad: This is quite possible, because there are states that are obstructing the meeting in principle, and they are going only to avoid embarrassment. They are opposed to any dialogue whether inside or outside Syria. Even the Russians, in several statements, have dampened expectations from this conference. But we should also be accurate in defining this dialogue, particularly in relation to what is happening on the ground. Most of the factions engaged in talking about what is happening in Syria have no influence on the ground; they donât even have direct relationships with the terrorists. In some instances these terrorists are directly linked with the states that are backing them, in other cases, they are mere gangs paid to carry out terrorist activities. So, the failure of the conference will not significantly change the reality inside Syria, because these states will not stop supporting the terrorists - conference or no conference, and the gangs will not stop their subversive activities. So it has no impact on them.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, the events in Syria are spilling over to neighboring countries. We see whatâs happening in Iraq, the explosions in Al-Rihaniye in Turkey and also in Lebanon. In Ersal, Tripoli, Hezbollah taking part in the fighting in Al-Qseir. How does Syria approach the situation in Lebanon, and do you think the Lebanese policy of dissociation is still applied or accepted?
President Assad: Let me pose some questions based on the reality in Syria and in Lebanon about the policy of dissociation in order not to be accused of making a value judgment on whether this policy is right or wrong. Letâs start with some simple questions: Has Lebanon been able to prevent Lebanese interference in Syria? Has it been able to prevent the smuggling of terrorists or weapons into Syria or providing a safe haven for them in Lebanon? It hasnât; in fact, everyone knows that Lebanon has contributed negatively to the Syrian crisis. Most recently, has Lebanon been able to protect itself against the consequences of the Syrian crisis, most markedly in Tripoli and the missiles that have been falling over different areas of Beirut or its surroundings? It hasnât. So what kind of dissociation are we talking about? For Lebanon to dissociate itself from the crisis is one thing, and for the government to dissociate itself is another. When the government dissociates itself from a certain issue that affects the interests of the Lebanese people, it is in fact dissociating itself from the Lebanese citizens. Iâm not criticizing the Lebanese government - Iâm talking about general principles. I donât want it to be said that Iâm criticizing this government. If the Syrian government were to dissociate itself from issues that are of concern to the Syrian people, it would also fail. So in response to your question with regards to Lebanonâs policy of dissociation, we donât believe this is realistically possible. When my neighborâs house is on fire, I cannot say that itâs none of my business because sooner or later the fire will spread to my house.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, what would you say to the supporters of the axis of resistance? We are celebrating the anniversary of the victory of the resistance and the liberation of south Lebanon, in an atmosphere of promises of victory, which Mr. Hasan Nasrallah has talked about. You are saying with great confidence that you will emerge triumphant from this crisis. What would you say to all this audience? Are we about to reach the end of this dark tunnel?
President Assad: I believe that the greatest victory achieved by the Arab resistance movements in the past years and decades is primarily an intellectual victory. This resistance wouldnât have been able to succeed militarily if they hadnât been able to succeed and stand fast against a campaign aimed at distorting concepts and principles in this region. Before the civil war in Lebanon, some people used to say that Lebanonâs strength lies in its weakness; this is similar to saying that a manâs intelligence lies in his stupidity, or that honor is maintained through corruption. This is an illogical contradiction. The victories of the resistance at different junctures proved that this concept is not true, and it showed that Lebanonâs weakness lies in its weakness and Lebanonâs strength lies in its strength. Lebanonâs strength is in its resistance and these resistance fighters you referred to. Today, more than ever before, we are in need of these ideas, of this mindset, of this steadfastness and of these actions carried out by the resistance fighters. The events in the Arab world during the past years have distorted concepts to the extent that some Arabs have forgotten that the real enemy is still Israel and have instead created internal, sectarian, regional or national enemies. Today we pin our hopes on these resistance fighters to remind the Arab people, through their achievements, that our enemy is still the same. As for my confidence in victory, if we werenât so confident we wouldnât have been able to stand fast or to continue this battle after two years of a global attack. This is not a tripartite attack like the one in 1956; it is in fact a global war waged against Syria and the resistance. We have absolute confidence in our victory, and I assure them that Syria will always remain, even more so than before, supportive of the resistance and resistance fighters everywhere in the Arab world.
Al-Manar: In conclusion, it has been my great honor to conduct this interview with Your Excellency, President Bashar al-Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic. Thank you very much. President Assad: You are welcome. I would like to congratulate Al-Manar channel, the channel of resistance, on the anniversary of the liberation and to congratulate the Lebanese people and every resistance fighter in Lebanon.
Al-Manar: Thank you.
33m:34s
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[Arabic] ÙÙۧۥ ۟ۧ۔ Ù
Űč ۧÙ۱ۊÙŰł ۚێۧ۱ ۧÙۣ۳ۯ - Bashar...
DAMASCUS, (SANA)-President Bashar al-Assad gave an interview to al-Manar TV broadcasted on Thursday,
Following is the full text of the...
DAMASCUS, (SANA)-President Bashar al-Assad gave an interview to al-Manar TV broadcasted on Thursday,
Following is the full text of the interview:
Al-Manar: In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Assalamu Alaikum. Bloodshed in Syria continues unabated. This is the only constant over which there is little disagreement between those loyal to the Syrian state and those opposed to it. However, there is no common ground over the other constants and details two years into the current crisis. At the time, a great deal was said about the imminent fall of the regime. Deadlines were set and missed; and all those bets were lost. Today, we are here in the heart of Damascus, enjoying the hospitality of a president who has become a source of consternation to many of his opponents who are still unable to understand the equations that have played havoc with their calculations and prevented his ouster from the Syrian political scene. This unpleasant and unexpected outcome for his opponents upset their schemes and plots because they didnât take into account one self-evident question: what happens if the regime doesnât fall? What if President Assad doesnât leave the Syrian scene? Of course, there are no clear answers; and the result is more destruction, killing and bloodshed. Today there is talk of a critical juncture for Syria. The Syrian Army has moved from defense to attack, achieving one success after another. On a parallel level, stagnant diplomatic waters have been shaken by discussions over a Geneva 2 conference becoming a recurrent theme in the statements of all parties. There are many questions which need answers: political settlement, resorting to the military option to decide the outcome, the Israeli enemyâs direct interference with the course of events in the current crisis, the new equations on the Golan Heights, the relationship with opponents and friends. What is the Syrian leadershipâs plan for a way out of a complex and dangerous crisis whose ramifications have started to spill over into neighboring countries? It is our great pleasure tonight to put these questions to H. E. President Bashar al-Assad. Assalamu Alaikum, Mr. President.
President Assad: Assalamu Alaikum. You are most welcome in Damascus.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, we are in the heart of the Peopleâs Palace, two and a half years into the Syrian crisis. At the time, the bet was that the president and his regime would be overthrown within weeks. How have you managed to foil the plots of your opponents and enemies? What is the secret behind this steadfastness?
President Assad: There are a number of factors are involved. One is the Syrian factor, which thwarted their intentions; the other factor is related to those who masterminded these scenarios and ended up defeating themselves because they do not know Syria or understand in detail the situation. They started with the calls of revolution, but a real revolution requires tangible elements; you cannot create a revolution simply by paying money. When this approach failed, they shifted to using sectarian slogans in order to create a division within our society. Even though they were able to infiltrate certain pockets in Syrian society, pockets of ignorance and lack of awareness that exist in any society, they were not able to create this sectarian division. Had they succeeded, Syria would have been divided up from the beginning. They also fell into their own trap by trying to promote the notion that this was a struggle to maintain power rather than a struggle for national sovereignty. No one would fight and martyr themselves in order to secure power for anyone else.
Al-Manar: In the battle for the homeland, it seems that the Syrian leadership, and after two and a half years, is making progress on the battlefield. And here if I might ask you, why have you chosen to move from defense to attack? And donât you think that you have been late in taking the decision to go on the offensive, and consequently incurred heavy losses, if we take of Al-Qseir as an example.
President Assad: It is not a question of defense or attack. Every battle has its own tactics. From the beginning, we did not deal with each situation from a military perspective alone. We also factored in the social and political aspects as well - many Syrians were misled in the beginning and there were many friendly countries that didnât understand the domestic dynamics. Your actions will differ according to how much consensus there is over a particular issue. There is no doubt that as events have unfolded Syrians have been able to better understand the situation and what is really at stake. This has helped the Armed Forces to better carry out their duties and achieve results. So, what is happening now is not a shift in tactic from defense to attack, but rather a shift in the balance of power in favor of the Armed Forces.
Al-Manar: How has this balance been tipped, Mr. President? Syria is being criticized for asking for the assistance of foreign fighters, and to be fully candid, it is said that Hezbollah fighters are extending assistance. In a previous interview, you said that there are 23 million Syrians; we do not need help from anyone else. What is Hezbollah doing in Syria?
President Assad: The main reason for tipping the balance is the change in peopleâs opinion in areas that used to incubate armed groups, not necessarily due to lack of patriotism on their part, but because they were deceived. They were led to believe that there was a revolution against the failings of the state. This has changed; many individuals have left these terrorist groups and have returned to their normal lives. As to what is being said about Hezbollah and the participation of foreign fighters alongside the Syrian Army, this is a hugely important issue and has several factors. Each of these factors should be clearly understood. Hezbollah, the battle at Al-Qseir and the recent Israeli airstrike â these three factors cannot be looked at in isolation of the other, they are all a part of the same issue. Letâs be frank. In recent weeks, and particularly after Mr. Hasan Nasrallahâs speech, Arab and foreign media have said that Hezbollah fighters are fighting in Syria and defending the Syrian state, or to use their words âthe regime.â Logically speaking, if Hezbollah or the resistance wanted to defend Syria by sending fighters, how many could they send - a few hundred, a thousand or two? We are talking about a battle in which hundreds of thousands of Syrian troops are involved against tens of thousands of terrorists, if not more because of the constant flow of fighters from neighboring and foreign countries that support those terrorists. So clearly, the number of fighters Hezbollah might contribute in order to defend the Syrian state in its battle, would be a drop in the ocean compared to the number of Syrian soldiers fighting the terrorists. When also taking into account the vast expanse of Syria, these numbers will neither protect a state nor âregime.â This is from one perspective. From another, if they say they are defending the state, why now? Battles started after Ramadan in 2011 and escalated into 2012, the summer of 2012 to be precise. They started the battle to âliberate Damascusâ and set a zero hour for the first time, the second time and a third time; the four generals were assassinated, a number of individuals fled Syria, and many people believed that was the time the state would collapse. It didnât. Nevertheless, during all of these times, Hezbollah never intervened, so why would it intervene now? More importantly, why havenât we seen Hezbollah fighting in Damascus and Aleppo? The more significant battles are in Damascus and in Aleppo, not in Al-Qseir. Al-Qseir is a small town in Homs, why havenât we seen Hezbollah in the city of Homs? Clearly, all these assumptions are inaccurate. They say Al-Qseir is a strategic border town, but all the borders are strategic for the terrorists in order to smuggle in their fighters and weapons. So, all these propositions have nothing to do with Hezbollah. If we take into account the moans and groans of the Arab media, the statements made by Arab and foreign officials â even Ban Ki-moon expressed concern over Hezbollah in Al-Qseir â all of this is for the objective of suppressing and stifling the resistance. It has nothing to do with defending the Syrian state. The Syrian army has made significant achievements in Damascus, Aleppo, rural Damascus and many other areas; however, we havenât heard the same moaning as we have heard in Al-Qseir.
Al-Manar: But, Mr. President, the nature of the battle that you and Hezbollah are waging in Al-Qseir seems, to your critics, to take the shape of a safe corridor connecting the coastal region with Damascus. Consequently, if Syria were to be divided, or if geographical changes were to be enforced, this would pave the way for an Alawite state. So, what is the nature of this battle, and how is it connected with the conflict with Israel.
President Assad: First, the Syrian and Lebanese coastal areas are not connected through Al-Qseir. Geographically this is not possible. Second, nobody would fight a battle in order to move towards separation. If you opt for separation, you move towards that objective without waging battles all over the country in order to be pushed into a particular corner. The nature of the battle does not indicate that we are heading for division, but rather the opposite, we are ensuring we remain a united country. Our forefathers rejected the idea of division when the French proposed this during their occupation of Syria because at the time they were very aware of its consequences. Is it possible or even fathomable that generations later, we their children, are less aware or mindful? Once again, the battle in Al-Qseir and all the bemoaning is related to Israel. The timing of the battle in Al-Qseir was synchronized with the Israeli airstrike. Their objective is to stifle the resistance. This is the same old campaign taking on a different form. Now whatâs important is not al-Qseir as a town, but the borders; they want to stifle the resistance from land and from the sea. Here the question begs itself - some have said that the resistance should face the enemy and consequently remain in the south. This was said on May 7, 2008, when some of Israelâs agents in Lebanon tried to tamper with the communications system of the resistance; they claimed that the resistance turned its weapons inwards. They said the same thing about the Syrian Army; that the Syrian Army should fight on the borders with Israel. We have said very clearly that our Army will fight the enemy wherever it is. When the enemy is in the north, we move north; the same applies if the enemy comes from the east or the west. This is also the case for Hezbollah. So the question is why is Hezbollah deployed on the borders inside Lebanon or inside Syria? The answer is that our battle is a battle against the Israeli enemy and its proxies inside Syria or inside Lebanon.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, if I might ask about Israelâs involvement in the Syrian crisis through the recent airstrike against Damascus. Israel immediately attached certain messages to this airstrike by saying it doesnât want escalation or doesnât intend to interfere in the Syrian crisis. The question is: what does Israel want and what type of interference?
President Assad: This is exactly my point. Everything that is happening at the moment is aimed, first and foremost, at stifling the resistance. Israelâs support of the terrorists was for two purposes. The first is to stifle the resistance; the second is to strike the Syrian air defense systems. It is not interested in anything else.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, since Israelâs objectives are clear, the Syrian state was criticized for its muted response. Everyone was expecting a Syrian response, and the Syrian government stated that it reserves the right to respond at the appropriate time and place. Why didnât the response come immediately? And is it enough for a senior source to say that missiles have been directed at the Israeli enemy and that any attack will be retaliated immediately without resorting to Army command?
President Assad: We have informed all the Arab and foreign parties - mostly foreign - that contacted us, that we will respond the next time. Of course, there has been more than one response. There have been several Israeli attempted violations to which there was immediate retaliation. But these short-term responses have no real value; they are only of a political nature. If we want to respond to Israel, the response will be of strategic significance.
Al-Manar: How? By opening the Golan front, for instance?
President Assad: This depends on public opinion, whether there is a consensus in support of the resistance or not. Thatâs the question. Al-Manar: How is the situation in Syria now?
President Assad: In fact, there is clear popular pressure to open the Golan front to resistance. This enthusiasm is also on the Arab level; we have received many Arab delegations wanting to know how young people might be enrolled to come and fight Israel. Of course, resistance is not easy. It is not merely a question of opening the front geographically. It is a political, ideological, and social issue, with the net result being military action.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, if we take into account the incident on the Golan Heights and Syriaâs retaliation on the Israeli military vehicle that crossed the combat line, does this mean that the rules of engagement have changed? And if the rules of the game have changed, what is the new equation, so to speak?
President Assad: Real change in the rules of engagement happens when there is a popular condition pushing for resistance. Any other change is short-term, unless we are heading towards war. Any response of any kind might only appear to be a change to the rules of engagement, but I donât think it really is. The real change is when the people move towards resistance; this is the really dramatic change.
Al-Manar: Donât you think that this is a little late? After 40 years of quiet and a state of truce on the Golan Heights, now there is talk of a movement on that front, about new equations and about new rules of the game?
President Assad: They always talk about Syria opening the front or closing the front. A state does not create resistance. Resistance can only be called so, when it is popular and spontaneous, it cannot be created. The state can either support or oppose the resistance, - or create obstacles, as is the case with some Arab countries. I believe that a state that opposes the will of its people for resistance is reckless. The issue is not that Syria has decided, after 40 years, to move in this direction. The publicâs state of mind is that our National Army is carrying out its duties to protect and liberate our land. Had there not been an army, as was the situation in Lebanon when the army and the state were divided during the civil war, there would have been resistance a long time ago. Today, in the current circumstances, there are a number of factors pushing in that direction. First, there are repeated Israeli aggressions that constitute a major factor in creating this desire and required incentive. Second, the armyâs engagement in battles in more than one place throughout Syria has created a sentiment on the part of many civilians that it is their duty to move in this direction in order to support the Armed Forces on the Golan.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel would not hesitate to attack Syria if it detected that weapons are being conveyed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Israel carried out its threats, I want a direct answer from you: what would Syria do?
President Assad: As I have said, we have informed the relevant states that we will respond in kind. Of course, it is difficult to specify the military means that would be used, that is for our military command to decide. We plan for different scenarios, depending on the circumstances and the timing of the strike that would determine which method or weapons.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, after the airstrike that targeted Damascus, there was talk about the S300 missiles and that this missile system will tip the balance. Based on this argument, Netanyahu visited Moscow. My direct question is this: are these missiles on their way to Damascus? Is Syria now in possession of these missiles?
President Assad: It is not our policy to talk publically about military issues in terms of what we possess or what we receive. As far as Russia is concerned, the contracts have nothing to do with the crisis. We have negotiated with them on different kinds of weapons for years, and Russia is committed to honoring these contracts. What I want to say is that neither Netanyahuâs visit nor the crisis and the conditions surrounding it have influenced arms imports. All of our agreements with Russia will be implemented, some have been implemented during the past period and, together with the Russians, we will continue to implement these contracts in the future.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, we have talked about the steadfastness of the Syrian leadership and the Syrian state. We have discussed the progress being achieved on the battlefield, and strengthening the alliance between Syria and the resistance. These are all within the same front. From another perspective, there is diplomatic activity stirring waters that have been stagnant for two and a half years. Before we talk about this and about the Geneva conference and the red lines that Syria has drawn, there was a simple proposition or a simple solution suggested by the former head of the coalition, Muaz al-Khatib. He said that the president, together with 500 other dignitaries would be allowed to leave the country within 20 days, and the crisis would be over. Why donât you meet this request and put an end to the crisis?
President Assad: I have always talked about the basic principle: that the Syrian people alone have the right to decide whether the president should remain or leave. So, anybody speaking on this subject should state which part of the Syrian people they represent and who granted them the authority to speak on their behalf. As for this initiative, I havenât actually read it, but I was very happy that they allowed me 20 days and 500 people! I donât know who proposed the initiative; I donât care much about names.
Al-Manar: He actually said that you would be given 20 days, 500 people, and no guarantees. Youâll be allowed to leave but with no guarantee whatsoever on whether legal action would be taken against you or not. Mr. President, this brings us to the negotiations, I am referring to Geneva 2. The Syrian government and leadership have announced initial agreement to take part in this conference. If this conference is held, there will be a table with the Syrian flag on one side and the flag of the opposition groups on the other. How can you convince the Syrian people after two and a half years of crisis that you will sit face to face at the same negotiating table with these groups?
President Assad: First of all, regarding the flag, it is meaningless without the people it represents. When we put a flag on a table or anywhere else, we talk about the people represented by that flag. This question can be put to those who raise flags they call Syrian but are different from the official Syrian flag. So, this flag has no value when it does not represent the people. Secondly, we will attend this conference as the official delegation and legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. But, whom do they represent? When the conference is over, we return to Syria, we return home to our people. But when the conference is over, whom do they return to - five-star hotels? Or to the foreign ministries of the states that they represent â which doesnât include Syria of course - in order to submit their reports? Or do they return to the intelligence services of those countries? So, when we attend this conference, we should know very clearly the positions of some of those sitting at the table - and I say some because the conference format is not clear yet and as such we do not have details as to how the patriotic Syrian opposition will be considered or the other opposition parties in Syria. As for the opposition groups abroad and their flag, we know that we are attending the conference not to negotiate with them, but rather with the states that back them; it will appear as though we are negotiating with the slaves, but essentially we are negotiating with their masters. This is the truth, we shouldnât deceive ourselves.
Al-Manar: Are you, in the Syrian leadership, convinced that these negotiations will be held next month?
President Assad: We expect them to happen, unless they are obstructed by other states. As far as we are concerned in Syria, we have announced a couple of days ago that we agree in principle to attend.
Al-Manar: When you say in principle, it seems that you are considering other options.
President Assad: In principle, we are in favour of the conference as a notion, but there are no details yet. For example, will there be conditions placed before the conference? If so, these conditions may be unacceptable and we would not attend. So the idea of the conference, of a meeting, in principle is a good one. We will have to wait and see.
Al-Manar: Letâs talk, Mr. President, about the conditions put by the Syrian leadership. What are Syriaâs conditions?
President Assad: Simply put, our only condition is that anything agreed upon in any meeting inside or outside the country, including the conference, is subject to the approval of the Syrian people through a popular referendum. This is the only condition. Anything else doesnât have any value. That is why we are comfortable with going to the conference. We have no complexes. Either side can propose anything, but nothing can be implemented without the approval of the Syrian people. And as long as we are the legitimate representatives of the people, we have nothing to fear.
Al-Manar: Letâs be clear, Mr. President. There is a lot of ambiguity in Geneva 1 and Geneva 2 about the transitional period and the role of President Bashar al-Assad in that transitional period. Are you prepared to hand over all your authorities to this transitional government? And how do you understand this ambiguous term?
President Assad: This is what I made clear in the initiative I proposed in January this year. They say they want a transitional government in which the president has no role. In Syria we have a presidential system, where the President is head of the republic and the Prime Minister heads the government. They want a government with broad authorities. The Syrian constitution gives the government full authorities. The president is the commander-in-chief of the Army and Armed Forces and the head of the Supreme Judicial Council. All the other institutions report directly to the government. Changing the authorities of the president is subject to changing the constitution; the president cannot just relinquish his authorities, he doesn\'t have the constitutional right. Changing the constitution requires a popular referendum. When they want to propose such issues, they might be discussed in the conference, and when we agree on something - if we agree, we return home and put it to a popular referendum and then move on. But for them to ask for the amendment of the constitution in advance, this cannot be done neither by the president nor by the government.
Al-Manar: Frankly, Mr. President, all the international positions taken against you and all your political opponents said that they donât want a role for al-Assad in Syriaâs future. This is what the Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal said and this is what the Turks and the Qataris said, and also the Syrian opposition. Will President Assad be nominated for the forthcoming presidential elections in 2014?
President Assad: What I know is that Saud al-Faisal is a specialist in American affairs, I donât know if he knows anything about Syrian affairs. If he wants to learn, thatâs fine! As to the desires of others, I repeat what I have said earlier: the only desires relevant are those of the Syrian people. With regards to the nomination, some parties have said that it is preferable that the president shouldnât be nominated for the 2014 elections. This issue will be determined closer to the time; it is still too early to discuss this. When the time comes, and I feel, through my meetings and interactions with the Syrian people, that there is a need and public desire for me to nominate myself, I will not hesitate. However, if I feel that the Syrian people do not want me to lead them, then naturally I will not put myself forward. They are wasting their time on such talk.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, you mentioned the Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal. This makes me ask about Syriaâs relationship with Saudi Arabia, with Qatar, with Turkey, particularly if we take into account that their recent position in the Arab ministerial committee was relatively moderate. They did not directly and publically call for the ouster of President Assad. Do you feel any change or any support on the part of these countries for a political solution to the Syrian crisis? And is Syria prepared to deal once more with the Arab League, taking into account that the Syrian government asked for an apology from the Arab League?
President Assad: Concerning the Arab states, we see brief changes in their rhetoric but not in their actions. The countries that support the terrorists have not changed; they are still supporting terrorism to the same extent. Turkey also has not made any positive steps. As for Qatar, their role is also the same, the role of the funder - the bank funding the terrorists and supporting them through Turkey. So, overall, no change. As for the Arab League, in Syria we have never pinned our hopes on the Arab League. Even in the past decades, we were barely able to dismantle the mines set for us in the different meetings, whether in the summits or in meetings of the foreign ministers. So in light of this and its recent actions, can we really expect it to play a role? We are open to everybody, we never close our doors. But we should also be realistic and face the truth that they are unable to offer anything, particularly since a significant number of the Arab states are not independent. They receive their orders from the outside. Some of them are sympathetic to us in their hearts, but they cannot act on their feelings because they are not in possession of their decisions. So, no, we do not pin any hopes on the Arab League.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, this leads us to ask: if the Arab environment is as such, and taking into account the developments on the ground and the steadfastness, the Geneva conference and the negotiations, the basic question is: what if the political negotiations fail? What are the consequences of the failure of political negotiations?
President Assad: This is quite possible, because there are states that are obstructing the meeting in principle, and they are going only to avoid embarrassment. They are opposed to any dialogue whether inside or outside Syria. Even the Russians, in several statements, have dampened expectations from this conference. But we should also be accurate in defining this dialogue, particularly in relation to what is happening on the ground. Most of the factions engaged in talking about what is happening in Syria have no influence on the ground; they donât even have direct relationships with the terrorists. In some instances these terrorists are directly linked with the states that are backing them, in other cases, they are mere gangs paid to carry out terrorist activities. So, the failure of the conference will not significantly change the reality inside Syria, because these states will not stop supporting the terrorists - conference or no conference, and the gangs will not stop their subversive activities. So it has no impact on them.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, the events in Syria are spilling over to neighboring countries. We see whatâs happening in Iraq, the explosions in Al-Rihaniye in Turkey and also in Lebanon. In Ersal, Tripoli, Hezbollah taking part in the fighting in Al-Qseir. How does Syria approach the situation in Lebanon, and do you think the Lebanese policy of dissociation is still applied or accepted?
President Assad: Let me pose some questions based on the reality in Syria and in Lebanon about the policy of dissociation in order not to be accused of making a value judgment on whether this policy is right or wrong. Letâs start with some simple questions: Has Lebanon been able to prevent Lebanese interference in Syria? Has it been able to prevent the smuggling of terrorists or weapons into Syria or providing a safe haven for them in Lebanon? It hasnât; in fact, everyone knows that Lebanon has contributed negatively to the Syrian crisis. Most recently, has Lebanon been able to protect itself against the consequences of the Syrian crisis, most markedly in Tripoli and the missiles that have been falling over different areas of Beirut or its surroundings? It hasnât. So what kind of dissociation are we talking about? For Lebanon to dissociate itself from the crisis is one thing, and for the government to dissociate itself is another. When the government dissociates itself from a certain issue that affects the interests of the Lebanese people, it is in fact dissociating itself from the Lebanese citizens. Iâm not criticizing the Lebanese government - Iâm talking about general principles. I donât want it to be said that Iâm criticizing this government. If the Syrian government were to dissociate itself from issues that are of concern to the Syrian people, it would also fail. So in response to your question with regards to Lebanonâs policy of dissociation, we donât believe this is realistically possible. When my neighborâs house is on fire, I cannot say that itâs none of my business because sooner or later the fire will spread to my house.
Al-Manar: Mr. President, what would you say to the supporters of the axis of resistance? We are celebrating the anniversary of the victory of the resistance and the liberation of south Lebanon, in an atmosphere of promises of victory, which Mr. Hasan Nasrallah has talked about. You are saying with great confidence that you will emerge triumphant from this crisis. What would you say to all this audience? Are we about to reach the end of this dark tunnel?
President Assad: I believe that the greatest victory achieved by the Arab resistance movements in the past years and decades is primarily an intellectual victory. This resistance wouldnât have been able to succeed militarily if they hadnât been able to succeed and stand fast against a campaign aimed at distorting concepts and principles in this region. Before the civil war in Lebanon, some people used to say that Lebanonâs strength lies in its weakness; this is similar to saying that a manâs intelligence lies in his stupidity, or that honor is maintained through corruption. This is an illogical contradiction. The victories of the resistance at different junctures proved that this concept is not true, and it showed that Lebanonâs weakness lies in its weakness and Lebanonâs strength lies in its strength. Lebanonâs strength is in its resistance and these resistance fighters you referred to. Today, more than ever before, we are in need of these ideas, of this mindset, of this steadfastness and of these actions carried out by the resistance fighters. The events in the Arab world during the past years have distorted concepts to the extent that some Arabs have forgotten that the real enemy is still Israel and have instead created internal, sectarian, regional or national enemies. Today we pin our hopes on these resistance fighters to remind the Arab people, through their achievements, that our enemy is still the same. As for my confidence in victory, if we werenât so confident we wouldnât have been able to stand fast or to continue this battle after two years of a global attack. This is not a tripartite attack like the one in 1956; it is in fact a global war waged against Syria and the resistance. We have absolute confidence in our victory, and I assure them that Syria will always remain, even more so than before, supportive of the resistance and resistance fighters everywhere in the Arab world.
Al-Manar: In conclusion, it has been my great honor to conduct this interview with Your Excellency, President Bashar al-Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic. Thank you very much. President Assad: You are welcome. I would like to congratulate Al-Manar channel, the channel of resistance, on the anniversary of the liberation and to congratulate the Lebanese people and every resistance fighter in Lebanon.
Al-Manar: Thank you.
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15 April: Solidarity Day with Bahrain Female Prisoners of Conscience -...
Neither in Egypt, nor in Tunisia were women assaulted during the uprisings that took place, even though many women participated and were active...
Neither in Egypt, nor in Tunisia were women assaulted during the uprisings that took place, even though many women participated and were active members in the revolutions and uprisings. As for Bahrain, the Arab Gulf country which should respect the religion, dignity, culture of its women, put many of these in prison.
Hence, Ayatollah Sheikh Issa Ahmad Qassem called for a campaign in solidarity with Bahraini female prisoners for the following aims:
1- Draw international attention to the oppression the Bahraini people are subject to, particularly women.
2- Morally support the Bahraini oppressed people.
3- Defining the legitimate demands of the people most important of which is a constitutional kingdom and elected government.
4- Mobilizing international rights organizations towards the blatant violations of women's rights in Bahrain.
5- Mobilizing the international public opinion and international women's organizations concerned about prisoners of "expressing opinion".
In the same context, the Bahraini Opposition overseas issued a statement in which it said "In response to the multiple methods the Bahraini authority resorts to in order to repress the people and the popular protests in demand of their rights, the people and the opposition insist to continue their peaceful protests despite all the aggression practiced against them."
Particularly speaking about women, the Bahraini Opposition overseas added in its statement that alongside men, the women in Bahrain have stood up to the government demanding their rights, having in return to bear imprisonment, torture, and martyrdom at times. The statement further noted that despite all this aggression, the Bahraini free women are still steadfast and unyielding.
The Bahraini Opposition overseas, therefore "called on the women of the Arab Nation as well as the World, to stand in defense of the Bahraini oppressed women, by that declaring the 15tho f April a day of solidarity with the women of Bahrain under the slogan "Free Women of Bahrain"."
Also, the Opposition urged all women's rights organizations in its statement , whether Arab, Islamic, or international to declare a clear rejection of what the women in Bahrain is subject to, which falls into the category of the these organizations' legal, ethical, and humanitarian duties.
"Save the women of Bahrain...Save the free women in prisons", concluded the statement.
http://www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=13903&cid=215
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[ENGLISH e-Book] Al-Ghadir and its Relevance to ISLAMIC UNITY by Shaheed...
Message of Thaqalayn
\"Al-Ghadir\" and its Relevance to Islamic Unity
________________________________________
Ayatullah Murtaza...
Message of Thaqalayn
\"Al-Ghadir\" and its Relevance to Islamic Unity
________________________________________
Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari
Translated by Mojgan Jalali
Vol. 3, No. 1 and 2 (1417 AH/1996 CE)
The distinguished book entitled \"al-Ghadir\" has raised a huge wave in the world of Islam. Islamic thinkers shed light on the book in different perspectives; in literature, history, theology, tradition, tafsir, and sociology. From the social perspective we can deal with the Islamic unity. In this review the Islamic unity has been dealt with from a social point of view.
Contemporary Muslim thinkers and reformists are of the view that unity and solidarity of Muslims are the most imperative Islamic exigencies at the present juncture when the enemies have made extensive inroads upon the Islamic community and have tried to resort to different ways and means to spread the old differences and create new ones. We are aware that Islamic unity and fraternity is the focus of attention of the Holy Legislator of Islam and is actually the major objective pursued by this Divine religion as firmed by the Qur\'an, the \"Sunnah\", and the history of Islam.
For this reason, some people have been faced with this question: Wouldn\'t the compilation and publication of a book such as \"al-Ghadir\" which deals with the oldest issue of differences among the Muslims- create a barrier in the way of the sublime and lofty objective of the Islamic unity?
To answer this question, it is necessary first to elucidate the essence of this issue, that is, the Islamic unity, and then proceed to examine the role of the magnum opus entitled \"al-Ghadir\"and its eminent compiler \'Allamah Amini in bringing about Islamic unity.
Islamic Unity
What is meant by the Islamic unity? Does it mean that one Islamic school of thought should be unanimously followed and others be set aside? Or does it mean that the commonalties of all Islamic schools of thought should be taken up and their differences be put away to make up a new denomination which is not completely the same as the previous ones? Or does it mean that Islamic unity is in no way related to the unity of the different schools of Fiqh (jurisprudence) but signifies the unity of the Muslims and the unity of the followers of different schools of Fiqh, with their different religious ideas and views, vis-a-vis the aliens?
To give an illogical and impractical meaning to the issue of the Islamic unity, the opponents of the issue have called it to be the formation of a single Madhhab, so as to defeat it in the very first step. Without doubt, by the term Islamic unity, the intellectual Islamic \'Ulama\' (scholars) do not mean that all denominations should give in to one denomination or that the commonalties should be taken up and the different views and ideas be set aside, as these are neither rational and logical nor favorable and practical. By the Islamic unity these scholars mean that all Muslims should unite in one line against their common enemies.
These scholars slate that Muslims have many things in common, which can serve as the foundations of a firm unity. All Muslims worship the One Almighty and believe in the Prophethood of the Holy Prophet (s). The Qur\'an is the Book of all Muslims and Ka\'abah is their \"qiblah\" (direction of prayer). They go to\"hajj\" pilgrimage with each other and perform the \"hajj\" rites and rituals like one another. They say the daily prayers and fast like each other. They establish families and engage in transactions like one another. They have similar ways of bringing up their children and burying their dead. Apart from minor affairs, they share similarities in all the aforementioned cases. Muslims also share one kind of world view, one common culture, and one grand, glorious, and long-standing civilization.
Unity in the world view, in culture, in the civilization, in insight and disposition, in religious beliefs, in acts of worship and prayers, in social rites and customs can well turn the Muslim into a unified nation to serve as a massive and dominant power before which the big global powers would have to bow down. This is especially true in view of the stress laid by Islam on this principle. According to the explicit wording of the Qur\'an, the Muslims are brothers, and special rights and duties link them together. So, why shouldn\'t the Muslims use all these extensive facilities accorded to them as the blessing of Islam?
This group of \'Ulama\' are of the view that there is no need for the Muslims to make any compromise on the primary or secondary principles of their religion for the sake of Islamic unity. Also it is not necessary for the Muslims to avoid engaging in discussions and reasons and writing books on primary and secondary principles about which they have differences. The only consideration for Islamic unity in this case is that the Muslims- in order to avoid the emergence or accentuation of vengeance - preserve their possession, avoid insulting and accusing each other and uttering fabrications, abandon ridiculing the logic of one another, and finally abstain from hurting one another and going beyond the borders of logic and reasoning. In fact, they should, at least, observe the limits which Islam has set forth for inviting non-Muslims to embrace it:
\"Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner... \"(16: 125)
Some people are of the view that those schools of fiqh, such as, Shafi\'i and Hanafi which have no differences in principle should establish brotherhood and stand in one line. They believe that denominations which have differences in the principles can in no way be brothers. This group view the religious principles as an interconnected set as termed by scholars of Usul, as an interrelated and interdependent set; any damage to one principle harms all principles.
As a result, those who believe in this principle are of the view that when, for instance, the principle of \"imamah\" is damaged and victimized, unity and fraternity will bear no meaning and for this reason the Shi\'ah and the Sunnis cannot shake hands as two Muslim brothers and be in the same rank, no matter who their enemy is.
The first group answers this group by saying: \"There is no reason for us to consider the principles as an interrelated set and follow the principle of \"all or none\". Imam \'Ali (\'a) chose a very logical and reasonable approach. He left no stone unturned to retrieve his right. He used everything within his power to restore the principle of \"imamah\", but he never adhered to the motto of \"all or none\". \'Ali (\'a) did not rise up for his right, and that was not compulsory. On the contrary, it was a calculated and chosen approach. He did not fear death. Why didn\'t he rise up? There could have been nothing above martyrdom. Being killed for the cause of the Almighty was his ultimate desire. He was more intimate with martyrdom than a child is with his mother\'s breast. But in his sound calculations, Imam \'All (\'a) had reached the conclusion that under the existing conditions it was to the interest of Islam to foster collaboration and cooperation among the Muslims and give up revolt. He repeatedly stressed this point.
In one of his letters (No.62 \"Nahj al Balaghah\") to Malik al-Ashtar, he wrote the following:
\"First I pulled back my hand until I realized that a group of people converted from Islam and invited the people toward annihilating the religion of Muhammad(s). So I feared that if I did not rush to help Islam and the Muslims, I would see gaps or destruction which calamity would be far worse than the several-day-long demise of caliphate.\"
In the six-man council, after appointment of \'Uthman by \'Abdul-Rahman ibn \'Awf, \'Ali (\'a) set forth his objection as well as his readiness for collaboration as follows:\"
You well know that I am more deserving than others for caliphate. But now by Allah, so long as the affairs of the Muslims are in order and my rivals suffice with setting me aside and only I am alone subjected to oppression, I will not oppose (the move) and will give in (to it).\" (From Sermon 72, \"Nahj al- Balaghah\").
These indicate that in this issue \'Ali (\'a) condemned the principle of \"all or none\". There is no need to further elaborate the approach taken by \'Ali (\'a) toward this issue. There are ample historical proofs and reasons in this regard.
\'Allamah Amini
Now it is time to see to which group the eminent \'Allamah, Ayatullah Amini - the distinguished compiler of the \"al-Ghadir\" - belonged and how he thought. Did he approve of the unity of the Muslims only within the light of Shi\'ism? Or did he consider Islamic fraternity to be broader? Did he believe that Islam which is embraced by uttering the \"shahadatayn\" (the Muslim creed) would willy-nilly create some rights for the Muslims and that the brotherhood and fraternity set forth in the Qur\'an exists among all Muslims?
\'Allamah Amini personally considered this point - i.e. the need to elucidate his viewpoint on this subject and elaborate whether\"al-Ghadir\" has a positive or a negative role in (the establishment of) Islamic unity. In order not to be subject to abuse by his opponent - be they among the pros and cons - he has repeatedly explained and elucidated his views.
\'Allamah Amini supported Islamic unity and viewed an open mind and clear insight. On different occasions, he set forth this matter in various volumes of the \"al-Ghadir\'. Reference will be made to some of them below:
In the preface to volume I, he briefly mentions the role of \"al-Ghadir\" in the world of Islam. He states: \"And we consider all this as service to religion, sublimation of the word of the truth, and restoration of the Islamic \'ummah\' (community).\"
In volume 3 (page 77), after quoting the fabrications of Ibn Taymiyah, Alusi, and Qasimi to the effect that Shi \'ism is hostile to some of the Ahl al-Bayt (the Household of the Prophet) such as Zayd bin \'Ali bin al-Huseyn, he notes the following under the title of \"Criticism and Correction\":
\"These fabrications and accusations sow the seeds of corruption, stir hostilities among the \'ummah\',create discord among the Islamic community, divide the \'ummah\', and clash with the public interests of the Muslims.
Again in volume 3 (page 268), he quotes the accusation leveled on the Shi\'ahs by Sayyid Muhammad Rashid Rida to the effect that \"Shi\'ahs are pleased with any defeat incurred by Muslims, so much as they celebrated the victory of the Russians over the Muslims.\" Then he says:
\"These falsehoods are fabricated by persons like Sayyid Muhammad Rashid Rida. The Shi\'ahs of Iran and Iraq against whom this accusation is leveled, as well as the orientalists, tourists, envoys of Islamic countries, and those who traveled and still travel to Iran and Iraq, have no information about this trend. Shi\'ahs, without exception, respect the lives, blood, reputation, and property of the Muslims be they Shi\'ahs or Sunnis. Whenever a calamity has befallen the Islamic community anywhere, in any region, and for any sects, the Shi\'ahs have shared their sorrow. The Shi\'ahs have never been confined to the Shi\'ah world, the (concept of) Islamic brotherhood which has been set forth in the Qur\'an and the \'sunnah\'(the Prophet\'s sayings and actions), and in this respect, no discrimination has been made between the Shi\'ahs and the Sunnis.\"
Also at the close of volume 3, he criticizes several books penned by the ancients such as \"Iqd al-Farid\" by Ibn Abd al-Rabbih, \"al-Intisar\" by Abu al-Husayn Khayyat al-Mu\'tazili,\"al Farq bayn al-Firaq\" by Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi, \"al-Fasl\" by Ibn Hazm al-Andulusi, \"al-Milal wa al-Nihal\" by Muhammad ibn Abdul-Karim al-Shahristani \"Minhaj al-Sunnah\" by Ibn Taymiah and \"al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah\"by Ibn Kathir and several by the later writers such as \"Tarikh al-Umam al-Islamiyyah\" by Shaykh Muhammad Khizri, \"Fajr al Islam\" by Ahmad Amin, \"al-Jawlat fi Rubu al-Sharq al-Adna\" by Muhammad Thabit al-Mesri, \"al-Sira Bayn al-Islam wa al-Wathaniyah\" by Qasimi, and \"al- Washi\'ah\" by Musa Jarallah. Then he states the following:
\"By quoting and criticizing these books, we aim at warning and awakening the Islamic \'ummah\' (to the fact) that these books create the greatest danger for the Islamic community, they destabilize the Islamic unity and scatter the Muslim lines. In fact nothing can disrupt the ranks of the Muslims, destroy their unity, and tear their Islamic fraternity more severely than these books.\"
\'Allamah Amini, in the preface to volume 5, under title of\"Nazariyah Karimah\" on the occasion of a plaque of honor forwarded from Egypt for \"al-Ghadir\", clearly sets forth his view on this issue and leaves no room for any doubt. He remarks:
\"People are free to express views and ideas on religion. These (views and ideas) will never tear apart the bond of Islamic brotherhood to which the holy Qur\'an has referred by stating that \'surely the believers are brethren\'; even though academic discussion and theological and religious debates reach a peak. This has been the style of the predecessors, and of the \'sahaba\' and the\'tabi\'un\', at the head of them.
\"Notwithstanding all the differences that we have in the primary and secondary principles, we, the compilers and writers in nooks and corners of the world of Islam, share a common point and that is belief in the Almighty and His Prophet. A single spirit and one (form of) sentiment exists in all our bodies, and that is the spirit of Islam and the term\'ikhlas,\"
\"We, the Muslim compilers, all live under the banner of truth and carry out our duties under the guidance of the Qur\'an and the Prophetic Mission of the Holy Prophet (s). The message of all of us is \'Surely the (true) religion with Allah is Islam ... (3:18)\' and the slogan of all of us is \'There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger.\' Indeed, we are (the members of) the party of Allah and the supporters of his religion.
In the preface to volume 8, under the title of \"al-Ghadir Yowahhad al-Sufuf fil-Mila al-Islami\", \'Allamah Amini directly makes researches into the role of \"Al- Ghadir\" in (the establishment of) Islamic unity. In this discussion, this great scholar categorically rejects the accusations leveled by those who said: \'Al-Ghadir\' causes greater discord among the Muslims. He proves that, on the contrary, \"Al-Ghadir\"removes many misunderstandings and brings the Muslims closer to one another. Then he brings evidence by mentioning the confessions of the non-Shi\'i Islamic scholars. At the close, he quotes the letter of Shaykh Muhammad Saeed Dahduh written in this connection.
To avoid prolongation of this article, we will not quote and translate the entire statements of \'Allamah Amini in explaining the positive role of \"al-Ghadir\" in (establishing) Islamic unity, since what has already been mentioned sufficiently proves this fact.
The positive role of \"al-Ghadir\" is established by the facts that it firstly clarifies the proven logic of the Shi\'ahs and proves that the inclination of Muslims to Shi\'ism - notwithstanding the poisonous publicity of some people - is not due to political, ethnic, or other trends and considerations. It also verifies that a powerful logic based on the Qur\'an and the \"sunnah\" has given rise to this tendency.
Secondly, it reflects that some accusations leveled on Shi\'ism - which have made other Muslims distanced from the Shi\'ah- are totally baseless and false. Examples of these accusations are the notion that the Shi\'ites prefer the non-Muslims to the non- Shi\'i Muslims, rejoice at the defeat of non-Shi\'ite Muslims at the hands of non-Muslims, and other accusations such as the idea that instead of going to hajj pilgrimage, the Shi\'ahs go on pilgrimage to shrines of the Imams, or have particular rites in prayers and in temporary marriage.
Thirdly, it introduces to the world of Islam the eminent Commander of the faithful \'Ali (\'a) who is the most oppressed and the least praised grand Islamic personality and who could be the leader of all Muslims, as well as his pure offspring.
Other Comments on \"al-Ghadir\"
Many unbiased non-Shia Muslims interpret the \"al-Ghadir\" in the same way that has already been mentioned.
Muhammad Abdul-Ghani Hasan al-Mesri, in his foreword on\"al-Ghadir\", which has been published in the preface to volume I, second edition, states:
\"I call on the Almighty to make your limpid brook (in Arabic, \'Ghadir\' means brook) the cause of peace and cordiality between the Shia and Sunni brothers to cooperate with one another in building the Islamic \"ummah.\"
\'Adil Ghadban, the managing editor of the Egyptian magazine entitled \"al-Kitab\", said the following in the preface to volume 3:
\"This book clarifies the Shi\'ite logic. The Sunnis can correctly learn about the Shi\'i through this book. Correct recognition of the Shi\'ahs brings the views of the Shi\'ahs and the Sunnis closer, and they can make a unified rank\".
In his foreword to the \"al-Ghadir\" which was published in thepreface to volume 4, Dr. Muhammad Ghallab, professor of philosophy at the Faculty of Religious Studies al-Azhar University said:
\"I got hold of your book at a very opportune time, because right now I am busy collecting and compiling a book on the lives of the Muslims from various perspectives. Therefore, I am highly avidfor obtaining sound information about \'Imamiyah\' Shi\'ism. Your book will help me. And I will not make mistakes about the Shi\'ahs as others have\".
In this foreword published in the preface to volume 4 of the\"al-Ghadir\", Dr. \'Abdul-Rahman Kiali Halabi says the following after referring to the decline of the Muslims in the present age and the factors which can lead to the Muslims\' salvation, one of which is the sound recognition of the successor of the Holy Prophet (s):
\"The book entitled \"al-Ghadir\" and its rich content deserves to be known by every Muslim to learn how historians have been negligent and see where the truth lies. Through this means, we should compensate for the past, and by striving to foster the unity of the Muslims, we should try to gain the due rewards\".
These were the views of \'Allamah Amini about the important social issues of our age and such were his sound reflections in the world of Islam.
Peace be upon him.
Text Source: http://www.al-islam.org/mot/default.asp?url=ghadir-relevance.htm
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ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Űč۔۱ Miracle of Quran - An Illeterate Person Became Hafiz e...
kazim karbalai kazim karbalai Miracle of Quran - An Illiterate Person Became Hafiz e Quran in one night iran pule ahanchi ulmas ayatullah and...
kazim karbalai kazim karbalai Miracle of Quran - An Illiterate Person Became Hafiz e Quran in one night iran pule ahanchi ulmas ayatullah and mujtehdeen examined and witnessed
http://moejezeasr.blogfa.com/
Re revelation of the Quran ( Miracle of the Quran )
Kazem Karbalai Saruqi village in the central province of functions, in the year 1275 Hijri was born in a poor family and religion. The family\\\\\\\'s main occupation was agriculture. But due to lack of personal property he had to work in the fields of others
In that year he worked day after day, in passing through the village shrine between sleep and waking, Alshhvdy is subject to discovery. During which a whole section on the Holy Quran. Leaders have sought to verify this. After testing, it\\\\\\\'s wonderful to be acknowledged. The documents are available to them. Kazim Quran could be read from the ends first. If someone deliberately sang a verse that was wrong. Became blind later in life. The rest of the land was in 1336 Hijri New Qom was buried in the cemetery
Here is sarogh an ancient city. The great and faithful men like Karbalaey kazem saroghy lived in this terriorty. Professor Jafar Sobhany says:
In 1333 (A.H) it is said that aman who was 50 years old and illitrate could read qoran by heart and show the place of any verse in it but he couldnât read any book or papper .karbalaek kazem saroghy said that he was learned it in a dream in fact, Qoran was inspired to him.
karbalaek kazem saroghy âs old son say: my father said that I was in shrine then two seyyed came there and learned me some thing that I didnât know what is it: but I know it was Arabic. We went to see Mr sabery araky chaplam of the place Mr sabery araky asked him some questions. He understood that karbalaek kazem saroghy was illiterate. So he declared that it was a miracle and God give him the blessing.
Aiatollah Makarem Shirazi says: I wanted to know the cause of giving him the blessing. After studing, I understood that he was a farmer who followed religious laws like lawful, unlawful activities and pay a thithe of his wealth.
He went to Qom in 6 th of Moharam and died in 9 th of it
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ۧ۱ۯÛŰšÙŰŽŰȘ 1392 ۚۧ Ù
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Karbalai Kazem
Re revelation of the Quran ( Miracle of the Quran )
Kazem Karbalai Saruqi village in the central province of functions, in the year 1275 Hijri was born in a poor family and religion. The family\\\\\\\'s main occupation was agriculture. But due to lack of personal property he had to work in the fields of others
In that year he worked day after day, in passing through the village shrine between sleep and waking, Alshhvdy is subject to discovery. During which a whole section on the Holy Quran. Leaders have sought to verify this. After testing, it\\\\\\\'s wonderful to be acknowledged. The documents are available to them. Kazim Quran could be read from the ends first. If someone deliberately sang a verse that was wrong. Became blind later in life. The rest of the land was in 1336 Hijri New Qom was buried in the cemetery
Here is sarogh an ancient city. The great and faithful men like Karbalaey kazem saroghy lived in this terriorty. Professor Jafar Sobhany says:
In 1333 (A.H) it is said that aman who was 50 years old and illitrate could read qoran by heart and show the place of any verse in it but he couldnât read any book or papper .karbalaek kazem saroghy said that he was learned it in a dream in fact, Qoran was inspired to him.
karbalaek kazem saroghy âs old son say: my father said that I was in shrine then two seyyed came there and learned me some thing that I didnât know what is it: but I know it was Arabic. We went to see Mr sabery araky chaplam of the place Mr sabery araky asked him some questions. He understood that karbalaek kazem saroghy was illiterate. So he declared that it was a miracle and God give him the blessing.
Aiatollah Makarem Shirazi says: I wanted to know the cause of giving him the blessing. After studing, I understood that he was a farmer who followed religious laws like lawful, unlawful activities and pay a thithe of his wealth.
He went to Qom in 6 th of Moharam and died in 9 th of it
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ŰŻ ۱۶ۧ ŰŽŰ§Ù ŰšŰčŰŻ ۧŰČ Ű§Ű·ÙۧŰč ۧŰČ Ű§ÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù Ű§ŰČ Ű·Ű±ÛÙ ÛÚ©Û Ű§ŰČ Ű§ŰłŰȘۧÙŰŻŰ§Ű±Ű§Ù Ù ÛÚ©Û Ű§ŰČ Ù۱Ù
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ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ ŰšÙ Ű§Ù ŰšÚŻÙÛÛŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰšÙ ŰŻŰ±ŰšŰ§Ű± Ù
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ŰźÙۧÙŰŻÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙ Ű”Ù۱ŰȘ Ùۧ۱ÙÙÙ Ű§ŰČ Ű§ÙŰȘÙۧ ŰšÙ Ű§ŰšŰȘۯۧ
âą
ŰȘŰŽŰźÛŰ” Űčۚۧ۱ۧŰȘ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ± Ù
ÛŰ§Ù Ú©ŰȘۧۚÙŰ§Û ŰčŰ±ŰšÛ Ù ÙŰ§Ű±ŰłÛ ŰšŰ§ ŰŻŰłŰȘ۟۷ÙŰ§Û ÛÚ©ÙÙۧ۟ŰȘ ۳۱ÛŰčۧ
âą
ۚۧŰČ Ú©Ű±ŰŻÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù ÙŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ù
Ú©Ű§Ù ŰąÛÙ ŰȘÙ۱ÛŰšŰ§Ù ŰšŰŻÙÙ ÙŰ±Ù ŰČŰŻÙ ŰšŰ§ Ù۱ ÚŰ§ÙŸ Ù۱۹ÙÛ
âą
ŰȘŰŽŰźÛŰ” ۳۱ÛŰč ۧ۟ŰȘÙۧ۷ Ú©ÙÙ
ۧŰȘ Ù ŰąÛۧŰȘ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšŰ§ ÙÙ
ŰŻÛگ۱ Ù ŰšŰ§ŰČ ÚŻÙÛÛ Ù
Ú©Ű§Ù Ù۱ کۯۧÙ
âą
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ۧŰȘ ۯ۱ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù ŰȘŰčۯۧۯ Ù Ù
Ú©Ű§Ù ŰȘک۱ۧ۱ Ù۱ کۯۧÙ
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Ú©Ű«Û
âą
ŰšÛŰ§Ù Ú©Ű±ŰŻÙ ŰȘŰčۯۧۯ Ű۱ÙÙ ŰłÙ۱ÙâÙۧ Ù Ű§Ű·ÙۧŰčۧŰȘÛ ŰŻŰ± Ù
Ù۱ۯ ŰȘک۱ۧ۱ Ű۱ÙÙۧ Ù...
âą
ŰȘŰŽŰźÛŰ” Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ Ûۧ ÙŰšÙŰŻÙ ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ ÙŰ§Û ÛÚ©ŰłŰ§Ù Ű§Ù۱ۧۯ ۚۧ ŰȘÙŰŹÙ ŰšÙ ÙÛۧŰȘ ۯ۱ÙÙÛ ŰąÙÙۧ
âą
ۧ۷ÙۧŰč ۯۧێŰȘÙ ŰŻŰ± ۧ۳۱ۧ۱ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù ŰźÙۧ۔ ŰąÛۧŰȘ
ŰȘŰłÙŰ· ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۚ۱ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰąÙ
ÙŰźŰȘÙÛ ÙŰšÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰšŰȘÙŰ§Ù Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰČÛ۱ ŰłÙŰ§Ù ŰšŰ±ŰŻ Ù Ù
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ۚۧ ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ŰšÛ ŰłÙۧۯ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰ ŰšÙ ŰșÛ۱ ۧŰČ ŰąÙÚ©Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ۧŰČ Ű§ŰšŰȘۯۧ ŰšÙ Ű§ÙŰȘÙۧ ŰÙŰž ŰšÙŰŻ Ù Ù
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ۧŰȘ Ù Ű۱ÙÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰȘŰłÙŰ·Û Ú©Ű§Ù
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ۧŰȘ Ù ŰŰȘÛ Ű۱ÙÙ ŰŻŰ± Ù۱ ŰłÙŰ±Ù Ù ŰŻŰ± Ú©Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰąÚŻŰ§Ù ŰšÙŰŻ.. ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ù
Ű«Ű§Ù Ű§ÚŻŰ± ۧŰČ Ű§Ù ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙ Ù
Û ŰŽŰŻ Ú©Ù Ú©ÙÙ
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ÚÙŰŻ ۚۧ۱ ۯ۱ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰȘک۱ۧ۱ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ű§Ù ŰłŰ±ÛŰč Ù ŰšŰŻÙÙ Ù
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Ú©Ű§Ù ÙŰ§Û ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ± ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ۰ک۱ Ù
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Ű«Ű§Ù ŰȘŰčۯۧۯ ŰȘک۱ۧ۱ ŰŰ±Ù ŰŻ ۯ۱ Ù۱ ŰłÙŰ±Ù Ű§Û ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ù
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ێ۟۔ ŰŹÙۧۚ Ù
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Û ŰŻŰ§ŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± Ú©ŰȘŰš ŰčŰ±ŰšÛ ŰŻŰ± Ù۱ ۏۧ Ú©Ù ŰąÛÙ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰąÙŰ±ŰŻÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻ ۳۱ÛŰčۧ ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ ÙŰ±Ù ŰČŰŻÙ Ú©ŰȘۧۚ ŰąÙ ŰąÛۧŰȘ Ù۱۹ÙÛ Ű±Ű§ ÙŰŽŰ§Ù Ù
Û ŰŻŰ§ŰŻ Ù ÚÚŻÙÙÚŻÛ ŰȘÙۧÙۧÛÛ ŰźÙŰŻ ۚ۱ ŰȘŰŽŰźÛŰ” ŰąÙÙۧ ۱ۧ ÙÙ۱ۧÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰąÛۧŰȘ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšŰ± ŰźÙŰ§Ù Ù
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Û ŰŽŰŻ Ù Ù۱ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙ ŰŻŰłŰȘ Ű§Ù ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ù
Û ŰŽŰŻ ( ۚۧ ŰȘŰčۯۧۯ ۚ۱گÙŰ§Û Ù
ŰȘÙۧÙŰȘ Ù Ű§ÙۯۧŰČÙ Ù
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Ű«Ű§Ù ÙŰșŰȘ ŰčŰ±ŰšÛ ÙÙ Ű±Ű§ ÙŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰšŰ± ۱ÙÛ Ú©Ű§ŰșŰ°Û 2 Ù
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Û ÙÙŰŽŰȘŰ ÛÚ© ۚۧ۱ ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰąÙ Ù ÛÚ© ۚۧ۱ ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ ŰșÛ۱ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ( Ú©Ù Űč۱ۚ ŰČۚۧÙŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ± ÚŻÙŰȘۧ۱ Ù ÙÙŰŽŰȘۧ۱ ۱ÙŰČÙ
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Û ŰŽŰŻ Ù ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙ Ù
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Û ŰȘÙۧÙŰłŰȘ ۚۧێۯ) ŰłÙŰ§Ù Ú©Ù Ù
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ÙŰŻ Ú©Ù Ú©ŰŻŰ§Ù
۱ۧ ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ Ù۱۹ÙÛ Ù Ú©ŰŻŰ§Ù
۱ۧ ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ ŰșÛ۱ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ. ۧŰČ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ú©Ù ÚÚŻÙÙÚŻÛ ŰȘÙۧÙۧÛÛ Ű§ŰŽ ۚ۱ ŰȘŰŽŰźÛŰ” Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ÛÚ©Û Ù ŰșÛ۱ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰŻÛÚŻŰ±Û Ű±Ű§ Ú©Ù ŰłÙŰ§Ù Ù
Û ÙÙ
ÙŰŻÙŰŻ ۚۧ ŰąÙÚ©Ù Ú©Ű§ŰȘŰš Ù ÙÙÛŰłÙŰŻÙ ŰąÙ ŰŻÙ Ú©ÙÙ
ÙŰ Ű§ŰČ ÙÛŰȘ ŰźÙŰŻ ÚÛŰČÛ Ű±Ű§ ۚ۱ ŰČŰšŰ§Ù ÙÛۧÙŰ±ŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻŰ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÚÙÛÙ Ù
Û ÚŻÙŰȘ Ú©Ù ŰąÙ ÙŰșŰȘÛ Ú©Ù ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ (ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ù
Ű«Ű§Ù ÙŰșŰȘ ÙÙ ) ۯ۱ Ù۞۱ Ù
Ù ÙÙ۱ۧÙÛ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù Ű±ÙŰŽÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù ŰąÙ ÙŰșŰȘ ÙÙ Ú©Ù ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ ŰșÛ۱ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ ŰȘÛŰ±Ù Ù
Û ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ Ù ÙÙ۱ ÙÙ
Û ŰŻÙŰŻ. ŰŰ§Ù Ù۱ ÙŰșŰȘÛ Ű§ŰČ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù ŰȘÙ۳۷ Ù۱ ÙŰ±ŰŻÛ Ű§ÚŻŰ± ÛÚ© ۚۧ۱ ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ Ù۱۹ÙÛ Ù ÛÚ© ۚۧ۱ ÙÛŰČ ŰšÙ ÙÛŰȘ ŰșÛ۱ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ Ù
Û ŰŽŰŻ Ù ŰšŰŻÙÙ ŰąÙÚ©Ù ÙÙÛŰłÙŰŻÙ ŰąÙ ŰŻÙ ÙŰșŰȘ Ûک۳ۧÙŰ Ű§ŰČ ÙÛŰȘ ŰźÙŰŻ ÚÛŰČÛ ŰšÚŻÙÛŰŻŰ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ÛÚ©Û Ù ŰșÛ۱ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰŻÛÚŻŰ±Û Ű±Ű§ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ŰšÙ ŰŻŰ±ŰłŰȘÛ ŰȘŰŽŰźÛŰ” Ù
Û ŰŻŰ§ŰŻ Ù ÙÙÛŰłÙŰŻÙ ŰąÙ ÙŰșۧŰȘ Ű”ŰŰȘ ÚŻÙŰȘۧ۱ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ۧ ŰȘ۔ۯÛÙ Ù
Û ÙÙ
ÙŰŻ.
Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ کۧ۞Ù
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ( Ù
Űč۱ÙÙ ŰšÙ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
) ŰšŰčŰŻ ۧŰČ Ű§Ùێۧۥ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰȘۧ ۹۟۱ ŰčÙ
۱ ŰšÙۧ ŰšÙ ŰŻŰčÙŰȘ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ Ù Ù
۱ۯÙ
ŰšÙ Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ ŰčŰ±Ű§Ù Ű Űč۱ۚ۳ŰȘŰ§Ù Ű Ú©ÙÛŰȘ Ű Ù
۔۱ Ù ŰŽÙ۱ÙŰ§Û ŰšŰČ۱گ ۧÛŰ±Ű§Ù ŰłÙ۱ Ù
ÛÚ©ÙŰŻ Ù ŰšŰ§ Ű۶Ù۱ ۯ۱ ۔ۯÙۧ ŰŹÙŰłÙ ŰčÙ
ÙÙ
Û Ù ŰźŰ”ÙŰ”Û ŰŻŰ± ۚ۱ۧۚ۱ ŰŹÙ
ŰčÛŰȘ Ú©Ű«Û۱ Ù ŰčÙÙ
Ű§Û Ű§ŰčÙۧÙ
Ù ÙÛŰČ Ű·Ùۧۚ ÙŸŰ±ŰłŰŽÚŻŰ± ŰšÙ ÙÙ
Ù ŰłÙۧÙۧŰȘ ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰź Ù
Û ŰŻÙŰŻ . Ù
Ű«ÙŰ§Ù Ú©ŰłÛ ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙ ŰąÙŰ§Û Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
Û ŰŻŰ± ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©ÙÙ
Ù (( ۧÙÙÙ )) ÚÙŰŻ ŰŻÙŰčÙ ŰȘک۱ۧ۱ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű Ű§Ù ŰšŰŻÙÙ ÙŰŰžÙ Ű§Û ŰȘۧÙ
Ù ŰȘŰčۯۧۯێ ۱ۧ Ù
Û ÚŻÙŰȘÙ . ŰłÙŰ§Ù Ú©ÙÙŰŻÚŻŰ§Ù ŰšŰčŰŻÛ ŰšŰŻÙÙ Ù۱۔ŰȘ ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Ű§ÛÙ ŰłÙŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ Ù
Û ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙŰŻÙ Ű§ÙŰŻ Ù Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ÙÙŰ±Û ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰź Ù
ÛŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ . ÚÙŰŻ Ùۧ Ű ÚÙŰŻ ۧÙÙ Ű ÚÙŰŻ ŰÛÙ
Ű ÚÙŰŻ Ú©Ű§Ù Ű ÚÙŰŻ Ű ÚÙŰŻ Ű ŰȘŰčۯۧۯ ÙÙ
Ù Ű±Ű§ ۚۯÙÙ ŰȘۧÙ
Ù Ù
Û ÚŻÙŰȘÙ . ŰŰȘÛ ŰȘŰčۯۧۯ Ù۱ Ú©ÙÙ
Ù Ű§ŰČ Ú©ÙÙ
ۧŰȘ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ۧگ۱ Ù
Û ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙŰŻ ۧŰčÙۧÙ
Ù
ÛÚ©Ű±ŰŻÙ . ŰąÛۧŰȘ Ù۱۹Ù« ۱ۧ ÙÛŰČ Ű§ŰČ ŰąŰźŰ± ŰšÙ Ű§ÙÙ Ù
ÛŰźÙۧÙŰŻÙ . کۯۧÙ
ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ùۧۯ۱ ۧ۳ŰȘ ÚÙÛÙ ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰź ÙۧÛÛ Ű±Ű§ ۚۯÙŰŻ Ű Ú©ŰŻŰ§Ù
ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙ ŰźÙŰŻ ۏ۱ۧŰȘ Ù
ÛŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ ŰŻŰ± Ù
ŰŻŰ±ŰłÙ ÙÛ۶ÛÙ ÙÙ
Ű ŰŻŰ± Ù
ۯۧ۱۳ ŰčÙÙ
ÛÙ ŰŽÙ۱ ÙŰŹÙ Ù ŰŻŰ± Ù
Ű۶۱ ŰčÙÙ
Ű§Û Ű§ŰčÙۧÙ
Ù ŰŻŰ± Ù
ÛŰ§Ù ŰźŰšŰ±ÙÚŻŰ§Ű±Ű§Ù ŰŻŰ§ŰźÙÛ Ù ŰźŰ§Ű±ŰŹÛ Ű§ŰŻŰčۧ Ú©ÙŰŻ Ù۱ ŰłÙۧÙÛ Ű§ŰČ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ§Ű±ÛŰŻ ŰšÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻ Ù ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰź ŰšÚŻÛ۱ÛŰŻ Ű
ŰȘŰłÙŰ· Ű§Ù ŰšŰ± ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ÙÙŰ· Ù
ŰŰŻÙŰŻ ŰšÙ ŰžÙۧÙ۱ ŰąÛۧŰȘ ÙŰšÙŰŻ ŰšÙÚ©Ù Ű§Ù ŰšŰ± Ù
Ú©Û Ù Ù
ŰŻÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰąÛۧŰȘŰ ŰŽŰ§Ù ÙŰČÙÙ ŰąÛۧŰȘŰ ŰźÙۧ۔ ŰąÛۧŰȘ Ù ... ÙÛŰČ Ű§Ű·ÙۧŰč Ù ŰąÚŻŰ§ÙÛ ŰŻŰ§ŰŽŰȘ Ù ÛÚ©Û Ű§ŰČ ÚŻÙۧÛÙ ÙŰ§Û ŰąÙ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ۯ۱ ۧÙۧ۟۱ ŰÛۧŰȘŰŽŰ§Ù ÙÙ
ÙÙ
ÛÙ Ù
Ű·ÙŰš ŰšÙŰŻ Ú©Ù Ú۱ۧ ÙÙŰ· ۧŰČ ŰžÙۧÙ۱ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű§ŰČ Ű§Ù ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙ ŰŽŰŻ.
ŰȘŰłÙŰ· ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÙÙŰ· ۚ۱ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙŰŻ Ù ÙÛÚ Ù
ŰȘÙ Ù Ûۧ Ú©ŰȘۧۚ ŰŻÛÚŻŰ±Û Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ ŰčÙŰȘ ŰšÛ ŰłÙۧۯ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ÙÙ
Û ŰȘÙۧÙŰłŰȘ ۚ۟ÙۧÙŰŻ.
ۧÙۯۧÙ
ۧŰȘÛ Ú©Ù ŰȘۧکÙÙÙ ŰŻŰ± ŰŹÙ
ÙÙŰ±Û Ű§ŰłÙۧÙ
Û Ű§ÛŰ±Ű§Ù ŰŻŰ±
۱ۧ۳ŰȘŰ§Û Ù
Űč۱ÙÛ Ű§ÛÙ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Ű§ÙۏۧÙ
گ۱ÙŰȘÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ
1- ÙŸŰźŰŽ ÙÛÚÙ ŰšŰ±ÙۧÙ
Ù Ű§Û ŰŻŰ± Ù
Ù۱ۯ ۧÛÙ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ÙŰČÙÙ Ù
ŰŹŰŻŰŻ ŰșÛŰšÛ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ± Ù
ۧÙÙŰ§Û Ù
ۚۧ۱ک ۱Ù
۶ۧÙŰ Ù۱ ŰłŰ§Ù Ű§ŰČ ŰŽŰšÚ©Ù ŰłŰ±Ű§ŰłŰ±Û Ű”ŰŻŰ§ Ù ŰłÛÙ
Ű§Û ŰŹÙ
ÙÙŰ±Û Ű§ŰłÙۧÙ
Û Ű§Û۱ۧÙ
2- ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ ÚÙŰŻÛÙ ŰŹÙŰŻ Ú©ŰȘۧۚ ۯ۱ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ۧÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù ŰšŰ±Ű§Û ÚŻŰ±ÙÙÙŰ§Û ŰłÙÛ Ù
ŰźŰȘÙÙ
3- ۚ۱ ÙŸŰ§ÛÛ Ú©ÙÚŻŰ±Ù ŰšÛÙ Ű§ÙÙ
ÙÙÛ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ ŰšŰ§ Ű۶Ù۱ ŰčÙÙ
ۧ Ù ŰŽŰźŰ”ÛŰȘ ÙŰ§Û ŰŻŰ§ŰźÙÛ Ù ŰźŰ§Ű±ŰŹÛ 59 Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ ŰŹÙŰ§Ù Ű§ŰłÙۧÙ
ۯ۱ Ù
۱ۯۧۯ Ù
Ű§Ù ŰłŰ§Ù 1386 ۯ۱ ۧ۱ۧک.
4- ۳ۧ۟ŰȘ ÙÛÙÙ
Û ŰšŰ± ۧ۳ۧ۳ ۯۧ۳ŰȘŰ§Ù ŰÙÛÙÛ ŰČÙŰŻÚŻÛ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ
5- Ùێ۱ Ù Ù
Űč۱ÙÛ Ű§ÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù ŰȘÙ۳۷ ۟ۚ۱گŰČŰ§Ű±Û ÙŰ§Û Ù
ŰźŰȘÙÙ ŰźŰšŰ±Û Ű§ÛÙŰȘ۱ÙŰȘÛ Ű§Û۱ۧÙÛ
6- ۧÙۏۧÙ
Ù
۔ۧŰŰšÙ ÙŰ§Û Ù
ŰȘŰčŰŻŰŻ ۚۧ Ù۱ŰČÙŰŻ ۧ۱ێۯ ۰کÙ۱ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ک۱Ù
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ۯۧÙێگۧÙÙۧ Ù ...
7- ŰšŰ±ÙŸŰ§ÛÛ ÙÚ©ÙۯۧێŰȘ ÙŰ§Û Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ÙÙۧ۷ Ù
ŰźŰȘÙÙ Ű§Û۱ۧÙ
8- ۱ÙÙÙ
ۧÛÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰȘÙŰŻÛŰł ÛۧۯۚÙŰŻ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۳ۧ۱ÙÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰŽÙ۱۳ŰȘŰ§Ù Ű§Ű±Ű§Ú©
9- Ű±Ù ÙÙ
ۧÛÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰȘÙ
ۚ۱ ÛۧۯۚÙŰŻ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ
10- ۫ۚŰȘ ۯ۱ ÙÙ۱۳ŰȘ ۹۫ۧ۱ Ù
ÙÙ ÙŰŽÙ۱ ŰšÙ ŰčÙÙŰ§Ù Ù
Ù۱ۧ۫ Ù
ŰčÙÙÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘŰ§Ù Ù
۱ÙŰČÙ Ù ŰȘÙۧێ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ű«ŰšŰȘ ŰŹÙۧÙÙ Ű§ÙÙ ÙۧÙŰčÙ Ù
ÙÙ
.
ÙŰŻÙ ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ۧŰČ ŰšŰ±ÙŰČ Ű§ÛÙ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Ù Ű§ŰłŰȘÙŰ§ŰŻÙ Ű§Û Ú©Ù ÙŰłÙ Ű§Ù
۱ÙŰČ
Ù ÙŰłÙ ÙŰ§Û ŰšŰčŰŻÛ ŰšŰŽŰ±ÛŰȘ Ù
Û ŰȘÙۧÙÙŰŻ ۧŰČ Ű§ÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù ŰšŰšŰ±ÙŰŻ:
ۚۚÛÙÛŰŻ ŰČÙ
ۧÙÛ Ú©Ù ÚÙÛÙ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Ű§Û ŰŻŰ± ۱ÙŰłŰȘŰ§Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù Ù
Û Ű§ÙŰȘŰŻ Ű ŰŰŻÙŰŻ ÛÚ© ÙŰČۧ۱ Ù ŰłÛ۔ۯ ŰłŰ§Ù Ű§ŰČ ÙŰČÙÙ Ù۱۹Ù« ۚ۱ ÙŸÛۧÙ
ۚ۱ ۧک۱Ù
گ۰ێŰȘÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù ŰŻÙÛŰ§Û ÙŰŻÛÙ
ŰŹŰ§Û ŰźÙŰŻ ۱ۧ ŰšÙ ŰŻÙÛŰ§Û ÙÙ Ù ŰŻÙÛŰ§Û ŰŻŰ§ÙŰŽ Ù ÙŸÛێ۱ÙŰȘ ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ . ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
ۧŰČ ÛÚ© ŰłÙ Ű§ŰłÛ۱ ŰŻŰłŰȘ Ú©ŰŹ ÙÙÙ
Û Ù ŰłŰ§ŰŻÙ Ű§ÙÚŻŰ§Ű±Û Ù
ŰłÙÙ
ۧÙŰ§Ù Ù۱ۧ۱ گ۱ÙŰȘÙ ( Ù ÙۧÙÙ Ű§Ù۱ÙŰłÙÙÙ Ûۧ ۱ÙŰšÙ Ű§ÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
ۧŰȘ۟۰Ùۧ Ù۰ۧ ۧÙÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù
ÙŰŹÙ۱ۧ )) Ù Ű§ŰźŰȘÙۧÙۧŰȘ ۯ۱ ۧÙ
ŰȘ ÙŸÛۧÙ
ۚ۱ ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
Ùۧ۱ۯ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù Ű§ŰČ ŰłÙÛ ŰŻÛگ۱ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ۧ۳ŰȘÙŰČۧۥ ۯ۱ Ù
کۧŰȘŰš ۶ۯ ŰŻÛÙ ÙۧÙŰč ŰšÙŰŻÙ ... Ù
ۧÙÙŰŻ Ù
Ú©ŰȘŰš Ù
ۧ۱ک۳ÛŰłÙ
Ù... Ù Ù
Û۱ÙŰȘ ŰȘۧ Ù۱۹Ù« ۯ۱ ۧÙŰČÙŰ§Û Ú©Ű§Ù
Ù Ù۱ۧ۱ ÚŻÛ۱ۯ . ۧÛÙۏۧ ŰšÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ù
ŰۧÙŰžŰȘ ۧŰČ Ù۱۹Ù« ŰšÙ Ù
ÛۧÙÙ ŰąÙ
ŰŻ : (( ۧÙۧ ÙŰÙ ÙŰČÙÙۧ ۧÙ۰ک۱ Ù Ű§Ùۧ ÙÙ ÙŰۧÙŰžÙÙ )) Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰšÚŻÙÙÙ Ű§Û ŰŽÚŻÙŰȘ ۧÙÚŻÛŰČ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û ŰšŰ§Ű± ŰŻÙÙ
ۚۧ ŰŰ°Ù Ù
۳ۊÙÙÛŰȘ ۱۳ۧÙŰȘ Ű ŰšŰ± ÙÙŰš ÛÚ© ۧÙŰłŰ§Ù ŰŽŰ§ÛŰłŰȘÙ ŰšÙ ÙۧÙ
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÙۧŰČÙ ÙÙ
ÙŰŻ Ù ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ۧÛÙ Ù
۱ۯ ۱ۧ ŰȘۧ ۹۟۱ ŰčÙ
۱ ŰšÙ ŰŻŰ§ŰźÙ Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ÙŰ§Û Ù
Ű·Ű±Ű Ű§ŰłÙۧÙ
Û Ù ŰŽÙ۱ÙŰ§Û Ù
ÙÙ
Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ ŰšÙ Ű۱کŰȘ ۯ۱ Ù
Û ŰąÙ۱ۯ ŰȘۧ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ù
۟ۧÙÙŰ§Ù Ù Ùۧ۹گۧÙŰ§Ù ŰšÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű±ÙŰŽÙ ŰŽÙŰŻ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù ŰŻŰ± Ű·ÙÙ Ű§ÛÙ Ù
ŰŻŰȘ ŰȘۧ ÙŸŰ§ÛŰ§Ù ŰčÙ
۱ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ŰȘŰłÙŰ· Ű§Ù ŰšŰ± ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŰȘÛ ŰšÙ Ű§ÙۯۧŰČÙ Ű°Ű±Ù Ű§Û ŰȘ۶ŰčÛÙ ÙÙ
Û ÚŻŰ±ŰŻŰŻ Ù Ű§ÛÙ Ù
ÙÙŰšŰȘ ۧŰČ Ű§Ù ÚŻŰ±ÙŰȘÙ ÙÙ
Û ŰŽÙŰŻ .
ŰłÙ۱ÛÙÙ
ۧÛŰȘÙۧ ÙÛ Ű§ÙۧÙŰ§Ù Ù ÙÛ Ű§ÙÙŰłÙÙ
ŰŰȘÛ ÛŰȘŰšÛÙ ÙÙÙ
ۧÙÙ Ű§ÙŰÙ ( ŰłÙŰ±Ù Ú©ÙÙ ŰąÛÙ 52 )
ÛŰčÙÛ : ŰšŰČÙŰŻÛ ÙێۧÙÙ ÙۧÛÛ Ű±Ű§ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ű§Ű«ŰšŰ§ŰȘ ŰÙۧÙÛŰȘ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ÙŰŽŰ§Ù Ù
ÛŰŻÙÛÙ
ۯ۱ Űč۔۱ Űۧ۶۱ Ú©Ù Ű§Ù۳ۧÙÙۧ ۯ۱ ŰŻÙÛۧ ۚۧ ۧÙÙۧŰč ۧÙŰ۱ۧÙۧŰȘ ÙÚ©Ű±Û Ù Ű§ŰčŰȘÙŰ§ŰŻÛ Ű±ÙŰšŰ±Ù ÙŰłŰȘÙŰŻ Ù ÙۧŰÙ ŰźÙŰŻ ۱ۧ گۧÙۧ ŰŹŰ§Û ŰÙ Ù
Û ÙێۧÙŰŻ Ù ŰÙŰ ŰšŰ§Ű·Ù ŰŹÙÙÙ ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ù
Û ŰŽÙŰŻ ŰȘۧ ۏۧÛÛ Ú©Ù Ű§ŰźÛ۱ۧ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
Ú©ŰȘۧۚ ۟ۯۧÙÙŰŻ ŰčۧÙÙ
ۯ۱ ŰąÙ
۱Ûکۧ ŰłÙŰČۧÙŰŻÙ Ù
Û ŰŽÙŰŻ Ù Ûۧ ۯ۱ Ú©ŰŽÙŰ±Û Ù
ۧÙÙŰŻ ÚÛÙ ŰšŰ§ ŰŹÙ
ŰčÛŰȘÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰŰŻÙŰŻ ÛÚ© Ù ÙÛÙ
Ù
ÛÙÛۧ۱ۯ ÙÙŰ±Û Ú©Ù ŰšŰ§ ۧÙکۧ۱ Ú©Ù
ÙÙÛŰłŰȘÛ Ű§ŰČ Ű§ŰłŰ§Űł ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ۟ۯۧÙÙŰŻ ۱ۧ Ù
Ùک۱ Ù
Û ŰŽÙÙŰŻ ŰŰ§Ù ÚÙ ŰšŰ±ŰłŰŻ ŰšÙ ŰÙۧÙÛŰȘ ۱۳ۧÙŰȘ ÙŰšÛ Ù
ک۱Ù
ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
Ù ŰźŰ§ŰȘÙ
ۧÙÙŰšÛÛÙ Ű۶۱ŰȘ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ Ù
۔۷ÙÛ (Ű”)Ű Ű±Ű§Ù ŰŻŰ±Ù
Ű§Ù ÚÛŰłŰȘŰ
ÛÚ©Û Ű§ŰČ ŰšÙŰȘ۱ÛÙ Ù Ù
Ù۫۱ŰȘ۱ÛÙ Ű±Ű§ÙÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰšÛŰ§Ù ŰÙۧÙÛŰȘ ÙŸÛۧÙ
ŰšŰ±Û ÙŸÛۧÙ
ۚ۱ ŰšŰČ۱گ ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
Ű۶۱ŰȘ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ(Ű”) ŰšÙ ŰčÙÙŰ§Ù ÙŸÛۧÙ
ۚ۱ ۚ۱ ŰÙ Ù ŰźŰ§ŰȘÙ
ۧÙÙÛ Ù Ú©ŰȘۧۚ Ű§Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙ ŰčÙÙŰ§Ù Ú©ŰȘŰ§ŰšÛ Ű§ÙÙÛ Ù ÙÙ
ÚÙÛÙ ŰŻŰłŰȘ ÙŰźÙŰ±ŰŻÙ Ù ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙ ÙŰŽŰŻÙ Ù
Û ŰȘÙŰ§Ù Ű§ÙۏۧÙ
ŰŻ Ű§ŰŻŰ Ù
Űč۱ÙÛ ŰŻŰ±ŰłŰȘ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ŰۧÙŰž ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰșÛ۱ ŰąÙ
ÙŰźŰȘÙÛ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù۱ۯ ŰšÛ ŰłÙŰ§ŰŻŰ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ کۧ۞Ù
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ Ù
Û ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ. ŰŰ§ŰŻŰ«Ù Ű§Û Ú©Ù ŰŻÙŰ§Ù Ù۱ ۧÙŰłŰ§Ù ŰŰȘÛ ÙŰŹÙŰŹÛ Ű±Ű§ Ù
Û ŰšÙŰŻŰŻ.
ÙÙ۳ۧÙۧŰȘÛ Ű±Ű§ Ú©Ù Ù
Űč۱ÙÛ Ù Ùێ۱ ۧÛÙ ŰŰ§ŰŻŰ«Ù ŰŻŰ± ۧÛŰ±Ű§Ù ŰŻŰ± Ű·ÙÙ
ŰȘۧ۱ÛŰź ŰšŰčŰŻ ۧŰČ ÙÙۧŰȘ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ŰšÙ ŰźÙŰŻ ŰŻÛŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ:
ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ ÙÙŰȘ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۯ۱ ŰłŰ§Ù 1326 Ù ŰźŰ§Ú©ŰłÙŸŰ§Ű±Û Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ± Ùۚ۱۳ŰȘŰ§Ù ÙÙ ŰŽÙ۱ ÙÙ
(( ۱Ùۚ۱ÙÛ Ű۱Ù
Ű۶۱ŰȘ Ù
ŰčŰ”ÙÙ
Ù ( Űł) ))Ű ŰšŰ§ ŰȘÙŰŹÙ ŰšÙ ŰČÙ
Ű§Ù Ű·Ű§ŰșÙŰȘ ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰąÙ ÙÙگۧÙ
Ù ŰłÙŰ·ÙŰȘ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ ۱۶ۧ ێۧÙŰ ŰłŰ§Ù ŰšÙ ŰłŰ§Ù Ù
Ű§ŰŹŰ±Ű§Û Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ÙŸÛŰŽ ŰąÙ
ŰŻÙ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۧŰČ Ű§Ű°ÙŰ§Ù ŰčÙ
ÙÙ
Û Ű±ŰźŰȘ ۚ۱ ۚ۳ŰȘ Ù ŰȘÙÙۧ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ Ù Ű§ŰșÙŰš Ű·Ùۧۚ ŰčÙÙÙ
ŰŻÛÙÛ Ù
Û ŰŻŰ§ÙŰłŰȘÙŰŻ ÚÙÛÙ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Ű§Û ŰŻŰ± ۧÛŰ±Ű§Ù Ű±Űź ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ . ۚۧ ÙÙÙŰč ۧÙÙÙۧۚ ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
Û ŰȘÙŰŹÙ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ Ù ŰčÙۧÙ
Ù
۱ۯÙ
ŰšÙ Ű·Ù۱ کۧÙ
Ù ŰšÙ Ù
ŰłŰ§ŰŠÙ Ű§ÙÙÙŰ§ŰšÛ Ù ŰłÛŰ§ŰłÛ Ù
ŰčŰ·ÙÙ ŰŽŰŻ Ù Ù
Ù۶ÙŰč ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ŰŰȘÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰšÛÙ ŰźÙۧ۔ ÙÛŰČ Ű±ŰźŰȘ ۚ۱ۚ۳ŰȘ ŰȘۧ ۧÛÙÚ©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰłŰ§Ù 1380 ŰŽÙ
ŰłÛ ÙÛÙÙ
ۯۧ۳ŰȘۧÙÛ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۚۧ ŰÙ
ۧÛŰȘ ÙÙ
Ù ŰŹŰ§ÙŰšÙ ŰŰŹÙ Ű§Ùۧ۳ÙۧÙ
Űۧۏ ŰąÙۧ Ù۱ۧۊŰȘÛ ŰšÙ ŰŻŰłŰȘ ŰąÙŰ§Û Űčۚۧ۳ Ù
ŰšŰŽŰ±Û Ù
ŰŻÛ۱ÛŰȘ ŰȘÙÛÙ Ù Ú©Ű§Ű±ÚŻŰ±ŰŻŰ§ÙÛ ÚŻŰ±ŰŻÛŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± ۧۯۧÙ
Ù ŰšŰ§ ۧÙۏۧÙ
Ù
۔ۧŰŰšÙ ÙŰ§Û Ù
ŰȘŰčŰŻŰŻ ۚۧ Ù۱ŰČÙŰŻ ۧ۱ێۯ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ŰąÙŰ§Û Űۧۏ ۧ۳Ù
ۧŰčÛÙ Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ Ű±ÙŰÛ ŰŹŰŻÛŰŻ ۯ۱ کۧÙۚۯ Ù
Űč۱ÙÛ Ù ŰȘÙŰŹÙ ŰšÙ Ű§ÛÙ ŰąÛŰȘ Ù Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ŰšŰČ۱گ ŰȘۧ۱ÛŰź ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
ÛŰčÙÛ ÙŰČÙÙ Ù
ŰŹŰŻŰŻ ŰșÛŰšÛ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰąÙ ÙÙ
ۯ۱ ŰČÙ
ۧÙÙ Ù
Ű§Ű Ùۧ۱ۯ ŰŽŰŻ Ù ŰȘÙۧێ ۚ۱ ŰąÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ú©Ù Ű§Ùێۧۥ ۧÙÙÙ Ù۱ ÚÙ ŰČÙŰŻŰȘ۱ ۧÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù ŰŹÙۧÙÛ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ù ŰšÙŰŻÚŻŰ§Ù ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ۯ۱ ۧÙŰ”Û ÙÙۧ۷ ŰčۧÙÙ
ۚۧ ۧÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù ŰčŰžÛÙ
۹ێÙۧ ÚŻŰŽŰȘÙ Ù Ù
ÙۏۚۧŰȘ ÙۯۧÛŰȘ ۱ÙŰČ Ű§ÙŰČÙÙ Ù ŰłŰ±ÛŰčŰȘ۱ ŰšÙŰŻÚŻŰ§Ù ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ŰšÙ ŰąÛÛÙ ÙŸŰ§Ú© Ù Ű”Ű±Ű§Ű· Ù
ŰłŰȘÙÛÙ
ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
ŰčŰČÛŰČ Ù۱ۧÙÙ
ŰąÛŰŻ. ۧÙێۧۥ ۧÙÙÙ
ۧÙŰÙ
ŰŻ ÙÙÙ Ű±Űš ۧÙŰčۧÙÙ
ÛÙ
ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰȘÙ۳۷ ۯ۱ ŰȘۧ۱ÛŰź ÙŸÙŰŹŰŽÙŰšÙ ŰŻÙÙ
ŰŽÙ۱ÛÙ۱ 1390 ۚۧ Ù
Ù۶ÙŰč
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۯ۱ ŰšÛŰ§Ù ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ Ù Ű§ŰŽŰźŰ§Ű”
ŰčÙÙ
ۧ Ù ŰŽŰźŰ”ÛŰȘ ÙŰ§Û Ű§ÙÙ ŰȘŰłÙÙ Ù ŰȘŰŽÛŰč Ú©Ù Ű±Űź ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ű§ÛÙ
Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Ű±Ű§ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ŰȘۧÛÛŰŻ Ù۱ۧ۱ ۯۧۯÙŰŻ
ۧÛÙ Ù
ۧۏ۱ۧ ۱ۧ ۧÙ۱ۧۯ ŰČÛŰ§ŰŻÛ ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ ŰŻÛŰŻÙ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ù Ű§ÙۏۧÙ
ۧÙ
ŰȘŰۧÙۧŰȘ ۧŰČ Ű§Ù ŰŻŰ± Ű·Û 38 ۳ۧÙŰ ŰȘۧÛÛŰŻ ÙÙ
ÙŰŻÙŰŻ Ù Ű§ŰłÙۧۯ ŰąÙ Ù
ÙŰŹÙŰŻ Ù
Û ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰȘŰčۯۧۯ ÙŰ§ŰšÙ ŰȘÙŰŹÙÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰąÙ Ű§ŰłÙۧۯ Ú©Ù Ù
۱ۚÙŰ· ŰšÙ ŰȘ۔ۯÛÙ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ گ۰ێŰȘÙ Ù
Û ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ ŰšÙ Ű”Ù۱ŰȘ Ù
Ú©ŰȘÙŰš ŰšÙŰŻÙ Ù ŰȘŰčŰŻŰ§ŰŻÛ Ű§ŰČ Ű§ÛÙ Ű§ŰłÙۧۯ ÙÛŰČ ÙÛŰŻÛÙÛÛ Ù
Û ŰšŰ§ŰŽÙŰŻ (ۧÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰłÙ 27 ۳ۧÙÚŻÛ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ÙÛ ŰŻŰ§ŰŻ Ù ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ 13 ŰłŰ§Ù Ù
ŰźÙÛ ÙÚŻŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ§ŰŽŰȘÙ ŰąÙ ŰȘÙ۳۷ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ű ŰŻŰ± ŰłÙ 40 ۳ۧÙÚŻÛ Ùۧێ ŰŽŰŻ Ù ŰȘۧ ÙŸŰ§ÛŰ§Ù ŰčÙ
۱ Ű§Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰłÙ 78 ۳ۧÙÚŻÛ ŰšŰ§ Ű§Ù ÙÙ
Ű±Ű§Ù ŰšÙŰŻ. ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۯ۱ ŰłŰ§Ù 1300 Ù.Ù ŰšŰ±Ű§ŰšŰ± ۚۧ 1257 Ù.ŰŽ ŰšÙ ŰŻÙÛۧ ŰąÙ
ŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰłŰ§Ù 1379 Ù.Ù ŰšŰ±Ű§ŰšŰ± ۚۧ 1336 Ù.ŰŽ ۧŰČ ŰŻÙÛۧ ۱ÙŰȘ).
ۧŰČ ŰŹÙ
ÙÙ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ Ù Ù
۱ۧۏŰč ŰȘÙÙÛŰŻ Űč۞ۧÙ
گ۰ێŰȘÙ Ù
Û ŰȘÙŰ§Ù 1- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ű§ÙŰčŰžÙ
Û ŰšŰ±Ùۏ۱ۯÛŰ2- ۧÙ
ۧÙ
ŰźÙ
ÛÙÛŰ 3- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ű§Ù
ÛÙÛ Ű”Ű§ŰŰš ۧÙŰșŰŻÛŰ±Ű 4- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
۱ŰčŰŽÛ ÙŰŹÙÛŰ 5- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
ÛÙۧÙÛŰ6- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰŰŹŰȘ Ú©ÙÙ Ú©Ù
۱ÛŰ 7- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰźÙۧÙ۳ۧ۱ÛŰ 8- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰłÛŰŻ ۧŰÙ
ŰŻ ŰČÙۏۧÙÛŰ 9- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰŻŰłŰȘŰșÛŰšŰ10- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ű”ŰŻŰ±Ű11- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ÙŰ§Ű¶Ù ÙÙک۱ۧÙÛ Ù ... ۱ۧ ÙۧÙ
ۚ۱ۯ.
ۧŰČ ŰŹÙ
ÙÙ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ Ù Ù
۱ۧۏŰč ŰȘÙÙÛŰŻ ŰČÙŰŻÙ ÙŰčÙÛ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰČÙ
Ű§Ù ŰŹÙۧÙÛ ŰźÙŰŻ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ۧ ۧŰČ ÙŰČŰŻÛÚ© ŰŻÛŰŻÙ Ű§ÙŰŻ Ù Ù
Ù۱ۯ ۧÙ
ŰȘŰŰ§Ù Ù ŰȘ۔ۯÛÙ Ù۱ۧ۱ ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ Ű§ÙŰŻ Ù
Û ŰȘÙŰ§Ù Ű§Ù۱ۧۯ ۰ÛÙ Ű±Ű§ ÙۧÙ
ۚ۱ۯ:
1- ۱Ùۚ۱ Ù
ŰčŰžÙ
ۧÙÙÙۧۚ ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰźŰ§Ù
ÙÙ Ű§Û ÛČ- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
کۧ۱Ù
ŰŽÛ۱ۧŰČÛ Ûł- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰźŰČŰčÙÛ ÛŽ- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰŽŰšÛŰ±Û ŰČÙۏۧÙÛ Û”- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ÙÙŰ±Û ÙÙ
ۯۧÙÛ Û¶- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰłŰšŰۧÙÛ Û·- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ÙŰÛŰŻ ۟۱ۧ۳ۧÙÛ Ûž- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
Ű”ŰšŰ§Ű ÛŰČŰŻÛ Ûč- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘŰ§ŰŻÛ Û±Û°- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ű”Ű§ÙÛ ÚŻÙÙŸŰ§ÛگۧÙÛ Û±Û±- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
ÙŰȘۯۧÛÛ Û±ÛČ- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
ŰÙÙŰžÛ Û±Ûł- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰŽŰ§Ù ŰąŰšŰ§ŰŻÛ Û±ÛŽ- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
۞ۧÙŰ±Û Û±Û”- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ÚŻŰ±Ű§Ù
Û Û±Û¶- ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰłÛŰłŰȘۧÙÛ
ÙÙ
ÚÙÛÙ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ کۧ۞Ù
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰšÙ ÙÙ
Ű±Ű§Ù ŰŽÙÛŰŻ ÙÙۧۚ Ű”ÙÙÛ ŰšÙ Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ Ù
۔۱ ۱ÙŰȘ Ù ÙÙ
ÚÙÛÙ ŰšÙ Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ Űč۱ۧÙŰ Ú©ÙÛŰȘ Ù Űč۱ۚ۳ŰȘŰ§Ù ŰłÙ۱ ÙÙ
ÙŰŻ Ù Ù
Ù۱ۯ ۧÙ
ŰȘŰŰ§Ù Ù ŰȘۧÛÛŰŻ Ù
ŰłÙÙ
ۧÙŰ§Ù Ű§ÙÙ ŰłÙŰȘ ÙÛŰČ Ù۱ۧ۱ گ۱ÙŰȘ.
Ű”ŰŻŰ§Û Ű§ÛÙ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ŰšŰČ۱گ ŰȘۧ ŰąÙۏۧ ۧÙŰŹ گ۱ÙŰȘ Ú©Ù Ű§Ù
Û۱ Ú©ÙÛŰȘ Ù ŰŻŰ§ÙŰŽÚŻŰ§Ù Ű§ÙۧŰČÙ۱ Ù
۔۱ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ۧ ŰšÙ Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ Ú©ÙÛŰȘ Ù Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ Ù
۔۱ ŰŻŰčÙŰȘ ÙÙ
ÙŰŻÙŰŻ Ù Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰčÙŰȘ ŰąÙŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ ۧۏۧۚŰȘ ÙÙ
ÙŰŻ Ù ŰšÙ ŰȘÙ
ۧÙ
ŰłÙۧÙۧŰȘ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ Ù ŰŻŰ§ÙŰŽÙ
ÙŰŻŰ§Ù Ű§ÛÙ ŰŻÙ Ú©ŰŽÙ۱ ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰźÙŰ§Û ŰÛ۱ŰȘ ۧÙÚŻÛŰČ ŰŻŰ§ŰŻ Ù Ù
Ù۱ۯ ŰȘۧÛÛŰŻ ŰąÙÙۧ ÙÛŰČ Ù۱ۧ۱ گ۱ÙŰȘ.
ۧÙ
Û۱ ÙÙÛŰȘ ۧŰČ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰčÙŰȘ ۱۳Ù
Û ÙÙ
ÙŰŻ Ù ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ Ű±ÙŰȘÙ Ű§Ù ŰšÙ ÙÙÛŰȘŰ Ű§Ù
Û۱ ÙÙÛŰȘ ŰȘÙŰ§Ű¶Ű§Û Ű§ÙۧÙ
ŰȘ Ű§Ù Ű±Ű§ ÙÙ
ÙŰŻ ŰȘۧ ÙŰ§ŰźÛ Ű±Ű§ ۚۧ ÙÙ
Ű© ۧÙ
ÙۧÙۧŰȘ ۯ۱ ۧ۟ŰȘÛۧ۱ Ű§Ù ÚŻŰ°Ű§Ű±ŰŻÙ ŰȘۧ Ű·ÙŰ§ŰšÛ ÙÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰÙŰž Ù
ÛâÙÙÙŰŻ ۯ۱ ÙŰČŰŻ Ű§Ù Ù
ŰŽŰșÙÙ ŰšŰ§ŰŽÙŰŻ ÙÙÛ ŰčÙÙ
Ű§Û ŰčŰ±Ű§Ù Ű§ÛÙ Ű§Ù
۱ ۱ۧ Ű”ÙŰ§Ű ÙۯۧÙŰłŰȘÙŰŻ Ù Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰšÙ ŰčŰ±Ű§Ù Ù ŰšŰčŰŻ ŰšÙ Ű§ÛŰ±Ű§Ù Ù ÙÙ
ۚۧŰČÚŻŰŽŰȘ.
ŰźÙŰ§Ű”Ù Ű§ÛÙÚ©Ù ŰȘÙ
ۧÙ
Û ŰčÙÙ
Ű§Û ŰȘŰŽÛŰč Ù ŰȘŰłÙÙ Ű§ŰčÙۧÙ
ۯۧێŰȘÙŰŻ Ű Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÛÚ© Ù۱ۯ ŰčŰ§ŰŻÛ ÙÛŰłŰȘ Ű ŰšÙÚ©Ù Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ Û ŰšŰČ۱گ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
ۧ۳ŰȘ Ú©Ù ŰšŰčŰŻ ۧŰČ ÙŸÛۧÙ
ۚ۱ ۧک۱Ù
Ű Ű§ÛÙÚŻÙÙÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
Ű Ûکۏۧ ۚ۱ ÙÙŰš Ű§Ù ÙۧŰČÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ .
ŰšŰč۶ۧ Ù
ÛÚŻÙÛÙŰŻ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ŰšŰČ۱گ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ± ÙŰ±Ù ŰšÛŰłŰȘÙ
. ۧÙ
ۧ ۚۧÛŰŻ ÚŻÙŰȘ ŰۧÙŰž Ù ŰčۧÙÙ
ŰŽŰŻÙ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ کۧ۞Ù
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰłŰ§Ű±ÙÙÛ ŰšÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
ۯ۱ Ú©Ù
ŰȘ۱ ۧŰČ ÚÙŰŻ ŰŻÙÛÙÙ Ű ŰšŰčŰŻ ۧŰČ ÙŰČÙÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©Ű±ÛÙ
ۚ۱ ÙŸÛۧÙ
ۚ۱ ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
Ű ŰšŰČ۱گŰȘ۱ÛÙ Ù
ŰčŰŹŰČÙ ŰšŰČ۱گ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ± Ű·ÙÙ ŰȘۧ۱ÛŰź ۧ۳ÙۧÙ
ۧ۳ŰȘ .
ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù
۱ŰčŰŽÛ ÙŰŹÙÛ (۱Ù) ۯ۱ Ű·ÙÙ ÛÚ© Ù
Ű§Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù
ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ۱ۧ ۚۧ Ù۱۹ÙÛ Ú©Ù ŰšÙ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ کۧ۞Ù
ک۱ÛÙ
Û ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ù Ű§ÙÙۧۥ ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻ Ù
ÙۧÛŰłÙ ÙÙ
ÙŰŻ Ù ŰŻÛŰŻÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± Ú©Ù Ù۱۹ÙŰ ŰŰȘÛ Ú©ÙÙ
Ù Ű§Û ŰšÛÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù
ÙŰŹÙŰŻ Ù Ù۱۹ÙÛ Ú©Ù Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ù
Û ŰźÙۧÙŰŻ ŰȘÙۧÙŰȘ ÙŰŹÙŰŻ Ùۯۧ۱ۯ Ù ŰȘÙÙۧ ÚÙŰŻ Ű۱کŰȘ ÙŰȘŰÙŰ Ú©ŰłŰ±Ù Ù Ű¶Ù
Ù ŰȘÙۧÙŰȘ ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ۯۧێŰȘ.
ۯ۱ ŰŰ§Ù Űۧ۶۱ ŰŻŰłŰȘÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ ÙۧÛÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰčÙÙ
ۧ ۯ۱ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ŰȘۧÛÛŰŻ ۧÛÙ Ű§ŰȘÙŰ§Ù ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ۯۧ۱ۯ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰČÛ۱ ŰšÙ ŰąÙÙۧ Ű§ŰŽŰ§Ű±Ù Ù
Û ÚŻŰ±ŰŻŰŻ.
ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ù Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۯ۱ ŰŹÙŰłÙ Ű§Û Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÛŰ© ۧÙÙÙ Ű§ÙŰčŰžÙ
Û ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰąÛۧŰȘÛ Ű±Ű§ ۧŰČ ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙŰŻ Ù Ű§Ù ŰšŰŻÙÙ Ù
ŰčŰ·ÙÛ ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰź ÚŻÙŰȘ . ŰłÙŸŰł ŰąÛŰ© ۧÙÙÙ ŰąÛÙ Ű§Û ŰȘÙۧÙŰȘ Ù
Û Ú©ÙŰŻ Ű Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ù
ÛÚŻÙÛŰŻ : ŰąÙۧ Ű ŰąÛÙ ŰąÙŰ·Ù۱ Ú©Ù ŰźÙۧÙŰŻÛŰŻ ÙÛŰłŰȘ . ŰąÙۧ Ù
Û Ù۱Ù
ۧÛŰŻ : Ù
Ù ÙÙ
ۧێŰȘŰšŰ§Ù ŰźÙۧÙŰŻÙ
Ű Űč۱۶ ک۱ۯ : ŰšÙÛ ŰąÙۧ Ű ŰŽÙ
ۧ Ù
ŰŹŰȘÙŰŻ Ù Ù
۱ۏŰč ŰȘÙÙÛŰŻ ÙŰłŰȘÛŰŻ Ű ÙÙÛ ŰąÛÙ ŰąÙ ÚŻÙÙÙ Ú©Ù ŰźÙۧÙŰŻÛŰŻ ÙÛŰłŰȘ ŰšÙÚ©Ù Ű§ÛÙ Ű·Ù۱ ۧ۳ŰȘ . ŰłÙŸŰł ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰąÙ۱ۯÙŰŻ Ù ŰŻÛŰŻÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ±ŰłŰȘ ÚŻÙŰȘÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ . ۯ۱ Ù
Ùۧ۱ۯ ŰźÙŰ§Ù ŰšÛÙ Ù۱ۧۥ ۳ۚŰčÙ Ű Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÛŰ© ۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ù۞۱ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ۧ ŰŹÙÛۧ Ù
Û ŰŽŰŻÙŰŻ Ù Ù۱ۧۊŰȘ Ű§Ù ŰšŰ±Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ù
ŰčŰȘۚ۱ Ù ÙŰ§ŰšÙ Ű§ŰčŰȘÙ
ۧۯ ŰšÙŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± Ù
ÙŰ±ŰŻÛ Ù۱Ù
ÙŰŻÙŰŻ : Ù
ۧ ŰłÙŰ±Ù ŰÙ
ŰŻ ۱ۧ ÙÙ
Û ŰȘÙۧÙÛÙ
ŰšÙ ÙÙÙ۱ۧ ۚ۟ÙۧÙÛÙ
Ű ÙÙÛ Ű§Ù ŰłÙŰ±Ù ŰšÙŰ±Ù Ű±Ű§ Ù
Û ŰȘÙۧÙŰŻ ۧŰČ Ű§ÙŰȘÙۧ ŰšÙ Ű§ÙÙ ŰšŰźÙۧÙŰŻ.
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۯ۱ ŰŹÙŰłÙ Ű§Û Ù ŰŻŰ± Ű۶Ù۱ ŰčÙÙ
ۧۥ ÙÙ
ŰšÙ Ű۶۱ŰȘ ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ù
ÛÚŻÙÛŰŻ : ŰŽÙ
ۧ ۳ۧŰčŰȘ Ùۧ ۧŰČ Ù
Ù ŰłÙŰ§Ù Ú©Ű±ŰŻÛŰŻ ۯ۱ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù Ù
Ù ÙÙ
Ù Ű±Ű§ ŰŹÙۧۚ ۯۧۯÙ
. ۧکÙÙÙ Ù
Ù ÛÚ© ŰłÙŰ§Ù Ù
Û ÙŸŰ±ŰłÙ
Ù ŰŽÙ
ۧ ŰŹÙۧۚ ۚۯÙÛŰŻ . ۧŰČ ŰąÙŰ§Û ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ù
Û ÙŸŰ±ŰłŰŻ :کۯۧÙ
ŰłÙŰ±Ù Ű§ŰČ ŰłÙŰ±Ù ÙŰ§Û ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ú©Ù ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ÙÙŰȘ ŰŰ±Ù Ű§ŰČ Ű۱ÙÙ ŰčŰ±ŰšÛ Ű±Ű§ ۯ۱ ŰąÛۧŰȘŰŽ ÙۧŰČÙ ÙÚ©Ű±ŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù ŰąÙ ÙÙŰȘ ŰŰ±Ù Ù
۱ۚÙŰ· ŰšÙ ÙÙŰȘ Ű·ŰšÙÙ ŰŹÙÙÙ
Ù
Û ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ۧŰČ ŰłÙŰ±Ù ŰÙ
ŰŻ ŰąÙÙۧ ۱ۧ ۚ۱ۯۧێŰȘÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ . ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ù ŰŻÛÚŻŰ±Ű§Ù Ú©Ù Ű§ŰČ ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰź ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙ ŰčۧۏŰČ Ù
Û Ù
ۧÙÙŰŻ ۧŰČ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰźÙۧ۳ŰȘ Ù
Û Ú©ÙÙŰŻ ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰź ŰłÙŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ ŰźÙŰŻ ŰšÚŻÙÛŰŻ .
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ù
Û ÚŻÙÛŰŻ : Ù ŰąÙ ŰłÙŰ±Ù ŰÙ
ŰŻ ۧ۳ŰȘ Ú©Ù ÙÙ
ÛŰŽÙ ŰŻŰ± ÙÙ
ۧŰČ Ù
Û ŰźÙۧÙÛŰŻ Ù ŰąÙ ÙÙŰȘ ŰŰ±Ù : ( Ű« Ű ŰŹ Ű Űź Ű Ű° Ű ŰŽ Ű Űž Ű Ù ) Ù
Û ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ Ù ŰȘÙŰłÛ۱ Ù ŰčÙŰȘ ÙۧŰČÙ ÙŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ÛÙ Ű۱ÙÙ ŰŻŰ± ŰłÙŰ±Ù ŰÙ
ŰŻ ÚÙÛÙ Ù
Û ÚŻÙÛŰŻ Ú©Ù Ű« ۧŰČ Ű«ŰšÙ۱ۧ Ù
Û ŰąÛŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰłÙŰ±Ù Ù۱ÙŰ§Ù Ù۱ۧ۱ ۯۧ۱ۯ Ù Ù
Ú©Ű§Ù Ű§ÙŰ±Ű§ŰŻÛ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ú©Ù ÙÙ
ۧŰČ ÙÙ
Û ŰźÙۧÙÙŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± Ű·ŰšÙÙ ŰČÛ۱ÛÙ ŰŹÙÙÙ
ۧ۳ŰȘŰ ŰŹ ۧŰČ ŰŹÙÙÙ
ۧ۳ŰȘŰ Űź Ú©Ù Ű§ŰČ ŰźŰłŰ±Ű§Ù Ù
Û ŰąÛŰŻŰ Ű° ۧŰČ Ű°ÙÙÙ
Ù
Û ŰąÛŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰźÙ۱ۧک ۧÙÙ ŰŹÙÙÙ
ŰšÙŰŻÙ Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰłÙŰ±Ù ŰŻŰźŰ§Ù Ù۱ۧ۱ ŰŻŰ§Ű±ŰŻŰ ŰŽ ۧŰČ ŰŽÛŰ·Ű§Ù Ù
Û ŰąÛŰŻŰ Űž ÙÙ
ۧŰČ Ù۞ۧ Ù
Û ŰąÛŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰąŰȘŰŽ ŰłÙŰČۧÙÛ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰŹÙÙÙ
Ù۱ۧ۱ ۯۧ۱ۯ Ù ŰšÙ ÛÚ© ÙŰŰžÙ Ű§ÙŰłŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ ۰ÙŰš Ù
Û Ú©ÙŰŻŰ Ù Ű§ŰČ Ù۶Űč ۧکۚ۱ Ù
Û ŰąÛŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰłÙŰ±Ù Ű§ÙŰšÛۧۥ Ù۱ۧ۱ ۯۧ۱ۯ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ۱ÙŰČ ÙÛۧÙ
ŰȘ Ù
۱ۯÙ
ۯ۱ Ù۶Űč ۧکۚ۱ ÙŰłŰȘÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰźŰŻŰ§ÙÙŰŻ ۚۧ ŰąÙÙۧ ÚÙ Ù
Û Ú©ÙŰŻŰ
- ŰšÙ ÙÙÙ Ű§ŰČ Ű±ÙŰČÙۧÙ
Ù ÙŰŻŰ§Û ŰÙ ŰŽÙ
Ű§Ű±Ù 44 â ŰłŰ§Ù 1344
ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰźŰ§Ù
ÙÙ Ű§Û Ù Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ű۶۱ŰȘ ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰźŰ§Ù
ÙÙ Ű§Û ŰŻŰ± ŰŻÛۯۧ۱ ۚۧ Ù۱ŰČÙŰŻ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۯ۱ ŰȘۧ۱ÛŰź 01/03/85
Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ۧ Ù
Ù ŰŻŰ± Ű۱Ù
Ű۶۱ŰȘ ŰčÙÛ ŰšÙ Ù
ÙŰłÛ Ű§Ù۱۶ۧ (Űč) ۯ۱ ŰŻÛŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙ
Ű ŰŻŰ± Ú©Ùۧ۱ Ù
ÙŰ§Ű±Ù Ù
۳ۏۯ ÚŻÙÙ۱ ێۧۯ ÙŰŽŰłŰȘÙ ŰšÙŰŻ . Ù۱۹ÙŰŽ ÙÙ
ŰŻŰłŰȘŰŽ ŰšÙŰŻ Ű Ù۱ Ú©Űł Ù۱ ŰąÛÙ Ű§Û Ű±Ű§ Ù
Û ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻ ۚۧ ۧÛÙ Ú©Ù Ű§Ű”Ùۧ ŰłÙۧۯ ÙۯۧێŰȘ Ù۱۹ÙŰŽ ۱ۧ ۚۧŰČ Ù
Ûک۱ۯ Ù ŰšŰ§ ŰŻŰłŰȘŰŽ ŰąÙ ŰąÛÙ Ű±Ű§ ÙŰŽŰ§Ù Ù
Û ŰŻŰ§ŰŻ . ۧÛÙ Ű±Ű§ Ù
Ù ŰźÙŰŻÙ
ŰŻÛŰŻÙ
Ù Ű§Ù
ŰȘŰŰ§Ù Ú©Ű±ŰŻÙ
ۧÛÙ ŰłÙ
ۧŰčÛ ÙŰšÙŰŻ . Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÙÙ
Ű§Ù Ú©ŰłÛ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ú©Ù ŰšÛŰłÙۧۯ Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰŹÙۧÙÛ ŰšŰ± ۧ۫۱ ÛÚ© ŰȘÙŰłÙ ŰšÙ Ű§Ù
ۧÙ
ŰČۧۯگۧÙÛ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ۳ۧ۱ÙÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŽŰŻ Ű ŰšÙŰŻÙ ÙÙ
۱ÙŰȘÙ
ŰąÙ Ű§Ù
ۧÙ
ŰČŰ§ŰŻÚŻŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ ŰČÛۧ۱ŰȘ ک۱ۯÙ
Ű ŰąÙ ŰŽŰšŰłŰȘۧÙÛ Ú©Ù Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŽŰš ۯ۱ ŰąÙۏۧ ŰšÛŰȘÙŰȘÙ Ú©Ű±ŰŻÙŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± ÙÙ
Ű§Ù ŰŹŰ§ ÙÙ
Ù
ŰŽŰ±Ù ŰšÙ ŰÙ
Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŽŰŻÙŰŻ ۱ۧ ŰšÙŰŻÙ Ű±ÙŰȘÙ Ù ŰŻÛŰŻÙ Ű§Ù
. ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ ۧÙ
ŰȘŰŰ§Ù Ù ŰȘۧÛÛŰŻ Ú©Ű±ŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ .
Ù
ÙÙŰčÛ Ú©Ù ŰŽÙÛŰŻ ÙÙۧۚ Ű”ÙÙÛŰ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ کۧ۞Ù
۱ۧ ŰšÙ Ù
ŰŽÙŰŻ ŰąÙ۱ۯÙŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± ۚۧÙŰ§Û Ù
Ùۚ۱ Ű§Ù Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ ŰčÙÙ
ۧ Ù
Űč۱ÙÛ Ú©Ű±ŰŻÙŰŻ ۧŰČ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ ŰłŰ€Ű§ÙÙۧÛÛ ŰŻŰ±ŰšŰ§Ű±Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù ŰąÛۧŰȘ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ú©Ű±ŰŻÙ
Ù ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ ŰŹŰČÙ Ú©Ű±Ű§Ù
ۧŰȘ ŰŻÛŰŻÙ
ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ ŰłÛŰŻ Ù
ŰÙ
ŰŻ ŰŹÙۧۯ ŰčÙÙÛ Ű·ŰšŰ§Ű·ŰšŰ§ÛÛ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ù Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÙÙÙ ŰąÛŰȘ ۧÙÙÙ Ű§ÙŰčŰžÙ
Û ŰšŰ±Ùۏ۱ۯÛ
Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÙŰ§Û ŰłÛŰŻ ۧ۳Ù
ۧŰčÛÙ ŰčÙÙÛŰ ÙŸŰłŰ± ŰčÙ
ÙÛ ÙŸŰŻŰ± ŰšÙŰŻÙ Ù ŰšŰ±Ű§ŰŻŰ±ŰČۧۯ۩ Ű۶۱ŰȘ ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ùâ ۱ŰÙ
Ű© âۧÙÙÙâ ŰčÙÛÙâ Ù ŰšÙŰŻ. ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ű±ŰŠÛŰł Ű§ŰŻŰ§Ű±Û Ű«ŰšŰȘ Ű§Ű±Ű§Ù ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻŰ Ű§ŰČۧÛÙ âŰ±Ù ŰšŰ§ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
۹ێÙۧÛÛ ÙŸÛۯۧ Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ Ù ŰšÛâۯ۱ÙÚŻ ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ ÙÙ
ÙŰČŰŻ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ÙŸŰŻŰ± Ù
ۧ ŰąÙ۱ۯÙŰŻ Ù ŰšÙ ÙŰłÛÙÛ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰźŰŻÙ
ŰȘ ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ű±ŰłÛŰŻÙŰŻ.
Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÛŰȘâۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ű°Ű§ŰȘŰ§Ù Ù۱ۯ ŰČÙŰŻ ۚۧÙŰ±Û ÙŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻŰ Ù۱ ۧۯŰčۧÛÛ Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙâ ŰłŰ§ŰŻÚŻÛ ÙÙ
Û âÙŸŰ°Û۱ÙŰȘÙŰŻ Ù ŰŻŰ± ۧÛÙ ŰČÙ
ÛÙÙ ŰšŰłÛۧ۱ ŰŻÙŰȘ Ù
Û âÙ۱ۯÙŰŻ.ۧŰČ ŰąÙۏۧ Ú©Ù ŰšÙŰŻÙ ŰŻŰ± ŰąÙ ŰČÙ
ۧÙŰ Ù
ŰŻŰ±ŰłÙ Ù
Û â۱ÙŰȘÙ
Ű ŰŻŰ± Ù۟۳ŰȘÛÙ ŰŹÙŰłÙ âŰ§Û ÙÙ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ۧ ۟ۯÙ
ŰȘ ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰąÙŰ±ŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻŰ Űۧ۶۱ ÙŰšÙŰŻÙ
. ÙŸŰŻŰ± Ù
Ù ŰŻŰ± ÙÙ
Ű§Ù ŰČÙ
ۧÙŰâ ۯۧ۳ŰȘŰ§Ù ŰąÙ ŰŹÙŰłÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û ŰšŰ±ŰźÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰŻÙŰłŰȘۧÙÛ ÙÙ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û ŰŻÛŰŻÙ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ŰšÙ Ù
ÙŰČÙ Ù
ۧ Ù
Û ŰąÙ
ŰŻÙŰŻŰ Ű§ŰČ ŰŹÙ
ÙÙ Ű۶۱ŰȘ ۧÙ
ۧÙ
Ù â۱ŰÙ
Ű©âۧ ÙÙÙ âŰčÙÛÙâÙ ÙÙÙ Ù
Û Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ. ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ù
Ûâ Ù۱Ù
ÙŰŻÙŰŻ Ú©Ù Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰąÙ ŰŹÙŰłÙ ŰłŰ€Ű§ÙۧŰȘ Ù
ŰźŰȘÙÙÛ Ű§ŰČ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ. ŰźÙŰŻ ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰۧÙŰž ۚ۳ÛŰ§Ű±Û Ű§ŰČ ŰąÛۧŰȘ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻŰ ÚÙۧÙâ Ú©Ù ÙŸŰŻŰ±Ù
Ù
Û Ù۱Ù
ÙŰŻÙŰŻ: ŰšÛŰŽ ۧŰČ ÛÚ©â ŰłÙÙ
ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰÙŰž ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ. ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰąÛÙ âŰ§Û Ű±Ű§ Ù
Û ŰźÙۧÙŰŻÙŰŻ Ù Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ۧۯۧÙ
Û ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰȘÙۧÙŰȘ Ù
Ûâ Ú©Ű±ŰŻŰ ÙÙ
Ű§Ù ÚŻÙÙÙ ÙÙ ŰŻŰ± ŰąÙ ŰČÙ
Ű§Ù Ù
ŰčÙ
ÙÙ ŰšÙŰŻ.
ÙŸŰŻŰ±Ù
ÙÙÙ Ù
Û Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰŰȘÛ ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰšŰ±ŰźÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰąÛۧŰȘ ۱ۧ ŰšÙ ÙÙ
Ù
Û Ú۳ۚۧÙŰŻÙŰŻŰ Ű§ŰšŰȘŰŻŰ§Û ÛÚ© ŰąÛÙŰ ŰšŰźŰŽÛ Ű§ŰČ Ù۳۷ ŰąÛÛ ŰŻÛگ۱ Ù Ű§ÙŰȘÙŰ§Û ŰąÛÛ ŰŻÛÚŻŰ±Û Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ ÙÙ
Ù
Ûâ Ú۳ۚۧÙŰŻÙŰŻ Ù ŰšÙ ŰčÙÙŰ§Ù ÛÚ© ŰąÛÙ Ù
Û ŰźÙۧÙŰŻÙŰŻ. Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ۚۧ ÙÙ
Ű§Ù ŰČŰšŰ§Ù ŰźÙŰŻŰŽ Ù
Û ÚŻÙŰȘ: ŰąÛÙ Ű§ÛÙ ÙÛŰłŰȘ.ÙŰłÙ
ŰȘ ۧÙÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ ÙÙ
Ű±Ű§Ù ŰŻÙۚۧÙÙâ ۧێ Ù
Û âŰźÙۧÙŰŻ Ù ŰŽÙ
Ű§Ű±Û ŰąÛÙ Ù ÙۧÙ
ŰłÙŰ±Ù âۧێ ۱ۧ ÙÙ
Ù
Û âÚŻÙŰȘ.ŰłÙŸŰł ۚ۟ێ ÙŰłŰ·Û Ű±Ű§ ۚۧ ÙŰšÙ Ù ŰšŰčŰŻ ŰąÙ Ù
Û âŰźÙۧÙŰŻ Ù ŰšŰčŰŻ ۚ۟ێ ۧÙŰȘÙۧÛÛ Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ ÙÙ
ÛÙ ŰȘ۱ŰȘÛŰš ŰšÛŰ§Ù Ù
Û âک۱ۯ. ۯ۱ ÙŰȘÛŰŹÙ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ű§ŰČ ÙÙ
Ű§Ù ŰŹÙŰłÛ Ű§ÙÙ ÙŰČŰŻ ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰŹÙÙÙ Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ.
Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ۚ۳Ûۧ۱ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ŰȘÙŰŹÙ ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ Ù۱ۧ۱ گ۱ÙŰȘÙ ŰšÙŰŻŰ ŰšÙ ÚŻÙÙÙâŰ§Û Ú©Ù ÚŻŰ§ÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰŰŻÙŰŻ ŰŻÙ ŰłŰ§ŰčŰȘ Ù
Û ÙŰŽŰłŰȘÙŰŻ Ù ŰšŰ§ ÙÙ
Ű”ŰŰšŰȘ Ù
Û Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ. ۧÛÙ Ű§Ù
۱ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ù
Ù ŰŹŰ§Û ÙŸŰ±ŰłŰŽ ۯۧێŰȘŰ ÚÙÙ ŰąÙ ŰČÙ
Ű§Ù ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±Ùۏ۱ۯÛŰ ŰŻŰ± ۧÙŰŹ Ù
۱ۏŰčÛŰȘ ŰŽÛŰčÙ Ù ŰČŰčۧÙ
ŰȘ ŰčۧÙ
Ù ŰšÙŰŻ Ù Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ÙÙ
Ù۱ۯ ŰšÛ âŰłÙŰ§ŰŻÛ ŰšÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ۞ۧÙ۱ ÙÛÚ ŰłÙŰźÛŰȘÛ ŰšŰ§ ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù ÙۯۧێŰȘ. Ù
Ù ŰšŰčŰŻ Ùۧ ۧŰČ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÙŰ§Û ŰłÛŰŻ ۧ۳Ù
ۧŰčÛÙ ŰčÙÙÛ Ù ÙŸŰŻŰ± ŰźÙŰŻÙ
ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙ
ÙÙ ŰąÛŰȘâۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰšÙ ÚÙ ŰŻÙÛÙ ÚÙÛÙ ŰȘÙŰŹÙÛ ŰšÙ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ§ŰŽŰȘÙŰŻŰ ÙŸŰŻŰ± Ù
Ù ŰŻŰ± ÙŸŰ§ŰłŰźŰ ŰšŰ± ŰŻÙ ÙÙŰȘÙ ŰšŰłÛۧ۱ ŰȘŰŁÚ©ÛŰŻ Ù
Û Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ:
Ù۟۳ŰȘ ۧÛÙÚ©Ù ŰąÛŰȘâ ۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±Ùۏ۱ۯÛŰ ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ێ۟۔ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
۱ۧ ŰŰŹŰȘÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰČÙ
Ű§Ù Ù
ۧ Ù
Û âۯۧÙŰłŰȘÙŰŻ.ŰŽŰźŰ”Û ÙÙ ÙۧÙ
ÙŰ§Ù ŰšÛ âŰłÙۧۯ ŰšÙŰŻŰ ŰšŰ§ ŰčÙۧÛŰȘ ÙÛÚÙ âŰ§Û ŰۧÙŰž ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻŰ ŰšÙ ÚŻÙÙÙâ Ű§Û Ú©Ù ŰŰȘÛ ÙÛÚÚŻÛ âÙŰ§Û ŰłÙŰ±Ù âÙۧ Ù ŰąÛÙ âÙۧ ۱ۧ ÙÛŰČ Ù
Ûâ ŰŽÙۧ۟ŰȘ. ۧÛÙ Ű§Ù
۱ ۧŰČ ŰąÙâ Ű±Ù Ű§ÙÙ
ÛŰȘ ۯۧێŰȘ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰąÙ ŰČÙ
ۧÙŰ ŰȘÙÙ۱ Ù
ۧŰȘ۱ÛۧÙÛŰłŰȘÛ Ù Ù
Ű§ŰŻÛ âگ۱ۧÛۧÙÛ ŰŰČŰš ŰȘÙŰŻÙŰ ŰšÙ ÙÛÚÙ ŰŻŰ± Ù
ŰۧÙÙ ŰčÙÙ
Û Ù ŰŻŰ§ÙێگۧÙÛ ŰšŰłÛۧ۱ ۏۧ ۧÙŰȘŰ§ŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻ. Ù۱ÚÙŰŻ ۧÛÙ ŰŰČŰš ۳۱کÙŰš ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻŰ Ű§Ù
ۧ Ù
ۚۧÙÛ ÙÚ©Ű±Û ŰąÙ ŰŻŰ± ŰšÛÙ ŰŹÙۧÙŰ§Ù Ù ŰŹŰ§Ù
ŰčÛ Ű±ÙŰŽÙ âÙÙŰ±Û ŰąÙ ŰČÙ
ۧÙŰ ŰšÙ ŰȘÙÙ۱ ŰșۧÙŰš ŰȘۚۯÛÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻ. Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ÙÛŰČ ŰšŰ§ ŰŻÛŰŻÚŻŰ§Ù ÚŻŰłŰȘŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰźÙŰŻŰ ŰšÙ ÙÙ
Ű© ŰŹÙŰšÙ âÙۧ ŰȘÙŰŹÙ ŰŻŰ§ŰŽŰȘÙŰŻ Ù Ù
ŰčŰȘÙŰŻ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ ÙÙ Ù
Űč۱ÙÛ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ŰšÙ ŰŹÙۧÙŰ§Ù ŰšÙ ŰčÙÙŰ§Ù ŰŰŹŰȘÛ ŰŻŰ± ۱ÙŰČگۧ۱ Ù
Ű§Ű Ùۧ۱ ۚ۳Ûۧ۱ Ù
ÙÙ
Û Ű§ŰłŰȘŰ
Ù
Ű·ÙŰš ŰŻÙÙ
ÙÙ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰšŰłÛۧ۱ Ù
ÙÙ
ŰšÙŰŻŰ ŰšŰŰ« ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙŰŻ. ۯ۱ ŰšÛÙ ŰčÙÙ
Ű§Û ŰŽÛŰčÙ Ű§ŰźŰȘÙŰ§Ù Ű§ŰłŰȘ ÙÙ ŰąÛۧ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ûۧ ŰźÛ۱. ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±Ùۏ۱ۯÛŰ ŰźÙŰŻ ÙۧÛÙ ŰšÙ ŰčŰŻÙ
ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻŰ Ű§Ù
ۧ ۚ۳ÛŰ§Ű±Û Ű§ŰČ ŰšŰČŰ±ÚŻŰ§Ù Ù
Ű§Ű Ù
ۧÙÙŰŻ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
۔ۧŰŰš ÙÙۧÛÙ Ù â۱۶ÙŰ§Ù âۧÙÙÙ âŰȘŰčۧÙÛâŰčÙÛÙâ Ù ŰŻŰ± ۧÛÙ Ù
۳ۊÙÙ ŰŽÙ Ù ŰŽŰšÙÙ ŰŻŰ§ŰŽŰȘÙŰŻ. ŰąÛŰȘâۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰšÙ ÚŻÙÙÙ ÙŰ§Û Ù
ŰźŰȘÙÙ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱ۧ ŰąŰČÙ
ۧÛŰŽ ک۱ۯÙŰŻ ŰȘۧ ۧÛÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ű«Ű§ŰšŰȘ ŰŽŰŻ ÙۧÙŰčŰ§Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙ ŰąÙ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰčÙۧÛŰȘ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ. ۯ۱ ۧÛÙ Ű”Ù۱ŰȘŰ Ù۱۹ÙÛ ÙÙ ŰšÙ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰčÙۧÛŰȘ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘŰ ŰšŰ§ÛŰŻ ÙÙ
Ű§Ù Ù۱۹ÙÛ ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ ÙÙ ŰšÙ Ű±ŰłÙÙ Ű§Ù۱Ù
Ùâ Ű”ÙÙۧŰȘ âۧÙÙÙâ Ù ŰłÙۧÙ
Ù âŰčÙÛÙâÙ ÙۧŰČÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù ŰŻŰ± ÙŰȘÛŰŹÙ ÙۚۧÛŰŻ ÙÛÚ ÚŻÙÙÙ ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰąÙ ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ۯۧێŰȘÙ ŰšŰ§ŰŽŰŻ.
ŰąÛŰȘâۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ÙÛŰČ ŰšŰ§Ű± Ùۧ ÙÙ
Û Ù
ÙŰ§Ű±ŰŻÛ Ű±Ű§ ÙÙ Ű§ŰŰȘÙ
Ű§Ù ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙ ŰŻŰ± ŰąÙÙۧ ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ۯۧێŰȘŰ Ű§ŰČ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ù
Û âÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙŰŻ Ù Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ÙÙ
Ú©Ù ÙÛÚâ ۧ۷ÙۧŰčÛ ŰŻŰ±ŰšŰ§Ű±Û ŰšŰŰ« ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ÙۯۧێŰȘŰ ÙÙŰ· ŰąÛۧŰȘÛ Ű±Ű§ ÙÙ Ű§ŰČ Ű§Ù ÙŸŰ±ŰłÛŰŻÙ Ù
Ûâ ŰŽŰŻŰ Ù
Ûâ ŰźÙۧÙŰŻ. ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰšŰ±ŰźÛ Ù
ÙŰ§Ű±ŰŻŰ ŰšŰčŰ¶Û Ű§ŰČ ŰąÛۧŰȘ Ù ŰłÙŰ±Ù âÙۧ ۱ۧ ÚÙŰŻÛÙ ŰšŰ§Ű± ŰšÙ ÚŻÙÙÙâ ÙŰ§Û Ù
ŰźŰȘÙÙ ŰȘŰșÛÛ۱ Ù
Û ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙŰŻŰ Ù
Ű«ÙŰ§Ù Ú©ÙÙ
ۧŰȘÛ Ű±Ű§ Ú©Ù ŰšŰ±ŰźÛ Ű§ŰČ ŰšŰČŰ±ÚŻŰ§Ù Ù
ۧÙÙŰŻ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
Ù
Û۱ŰČۧ ŰŰłÛÙ ÙÙŰ±Û Ù
ŰčŰȘÙŰŻ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ Ú©Ù ŰŹŰČÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙ Ù ŰŰ°Ù ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘŰ ŰŻŰ± ŰąÛÙ Ù
Û âŰąÙ۱ۯÙŰŻ Ù Ù
Û ŰźÙۧÙŰŻÙŰŻ. Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ŰąÛÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰȘŰ”ŰÛŰ Ù
Û Ù۱ۯ Ù Ù
Û ÚŻÙŰȘ: ÙÙŰ Ű§ÛÙ Ű·Ù۱ ÙÛŰłŰȘŰ ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ Ű§ÛÙ ÙÙÙ
ÙŰ ŰąÙ ÙÙÙ
Ù Ű§ŰłŰȘ. ŰšŰŰ« ۧ۫ۚۧŰȘ ŰčŰŻÙ
ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙ Ù۱۹ÙŰ ÛÙÛ Ű§ŰČ Ù
۳ۧۊÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻ ÙÙ ŰšŰłÛۧ۱ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ŰčÙۧÛŰȘ ŰąÛŰȘ âۧÙÙÙ ŰšŰ±ÙŰŹŰ±ŰŻÛ ŰšÙŰŻ Ù Ù
Ù ŰŽÙÛŰŻÙ
ÙÙ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ ŰąŰŽÙۧÛÛ ŰšŰ§ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ű ÙۧÛÙ ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ ÙÙ ÙÛÚ ŰȘŰ۱ÛÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ű”Ù۱ŰȘ Ùگ۱ÙŰȘÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù ŰŻŰ± ۧÛÙ ŰČÙ
ÛÙÙŰ Ű§Ű·Ù
ÛÙŰ§Ù ÛۧÙŰȘÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ.
ŰźÙŰŻ Ù
Ù Ű§ÛÙ ŰźŰ§Ű·Ű±Ù Ű±Ű§ ۯۧ۱Ù
ÙÙ ŰŹÙŰłÙâŰ§Û ŰŻŰ± Ù
ÙŰČÙ Ù
ۧ ۚ۱گŰČۧ۱ ŰŽŰŻ Ù ŰŰŻÙŰŻ ŰŻÙ ŰȘۧ ÙŸŰ§ÙŰČŰŻÙ ÙÙ۱ ۧŰČ ŰčÙÙ
ۧ ÙÙ
ÚÙÙ Ű۶۱ŰȘ ۧÙ
ۧÙ
Ű Űۧۏâ ŰąÙۧ Ù
۱ŰȘŰ¶Û ŰŰ§ŰŠŰ±Û Ù Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
Űۧۏ ÙÙÛÙÛ Ű±ŰŽŰȘÛŰ Ù ÙÛŰČ ŰąÙŰ§Û Ű§ŰłÙ
ۧŰčÛÙ ŰčÙÙÛ Ù Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
Ű۶Ù۱ ۯۧێŰȘÙŰŻ. ÙŸŰł ۧŰČ Ű”Ű±Ù ÙÙŰ§Ű±Ű ÙÙŰšŰȘ ŰšÙ ŰąŰČÙ
ۧÛŰŽ ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
۱۳ÛŰŻ. ŰŰ§Ű¶Ű±Ű§Ù ÙŰȘۧۚ ŰŽŰ±Ű ÙÙ
ŰčÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û ŰąŰČÙ
ÙÙ Ű§ÙŰȘ۟ۧۚ ک۱ۯÙŰŻ. ۧÛÙ ÙŰȘۧۚ ŰšÙ ŰČŰšŰ§Ù ŰčŰ±ŰšÛ Ű§ŰłŰȘ Ù ŰŻŰ± ŰŹŰ§Û âŰŹŰ§Û ŰąÙŰ ŰąÛÙ Ù ŰŰŻÛŰ« ÙÛŰČ ÙŰłŰȘ. ۧÛÙ Ú©ŰȘۧۚ ۱ۧ ÙŸÛŰŽ ۱ÙÛ Ú©Ű±ŰšÙŰ§Û Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
گ۰ۧێŰȘÙŰŻ. ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰłŰȘ Ù
Û ÚŻŰ°Ű§ŰŽŰȘ Ù Ù
ŰȘÙ ŰčŰ±ŰšÛ ŰŽÙÛŰŻ ۱ۧ ۱ۯ Ù
Û ÙŰ±ŰŻŰ ÚÙÙ ÙÙ
Û ŰȘÙۧÙŰłŰȘ ۚ۟ÙۧÙŰŻŰ Ű±ÙۧÛŰȘ âÙۧ ۱ۧ ÙÙ
ÙÙ
Û âŰȘÙۧÙŰłŰȘ ۚ۟ÙۧÙŰŻ Ù Ű±ŰŻ Ù
Û ÙŰ±ŰŻŰ Ű§Ù
ۧ ÙÙŰȘÛ ŰšÙ ÛÙ ÙÙÙ
Û ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù
Û â۱۳ÛŰŻŰ ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ Ù
Û ŰźÙۧÙŰŻ.
ŰąÙÚÙ Ù
ÙŰŹŰš ŰȘŰčŰŹŰš Ù
Ù ŰšÙŰŻŰ Ű§ÛÙ ŰšÙŰŻ ÙÙ Ú©ÙÙ
ۧŰȘÛ Ù
Ű«Ù Â«Ű§ÙÙÙ» ۱ۧ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ± Ù
ŰȘÙ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰŽÙÛŰŻ Ù ŰŰȘÛ ŰŻŰ± ۱ÙۧÛŰȘ ŰšÙŰŻŰ ÙÙ
Û âŰŻÛŰŻ Ù ÙÙ
Û âŰȘÙۧÙŰłŰȘ ۚ۟ÙۧÙŰŻŰ Ű§Ù
ۧ ۯ۱ ŰąÛÙ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù
Û âŰȘÙۧÙŰłŰȘ ۚ۟ÙۧÙŰŻ. ۧÛÙ ŰąŰČÙ
ۧÛŰŽ ۱ۧ ÚÙŰŻÛÙ ŰšŰ§Ű± ۧÙۏۧÙ
ۯۧۯÙŰŻŰ Ù
Ű«ÙŰ§Ù Ù
ÙŰ§Ű±ŰŻÛ Ű±Ű§ Ù
ێ۟۔ ÙŰ±ŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻÙŰŻ ÙÙ ŰąÛÙ Ù Ű±ÙۧÛŰȘ ŰšÙ ÙÙ
ŰąÙ
ÛŰźŰȘÙ ŰšÙŰŻŰ ŰŻÙ Ú©ÙÙ
Û ÛÚ©ŰłŰ§Ù Ù Ù
Ű«ÙŰ§Ù Â«Ű§ÙÙÙÂ»Ù Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ Ű§Ù ÙŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ§ŰŻÙŰŻ Ù ÚŻÙŰȘÙŰŻ ÙÙ Ű§ÛÙ Â«Ű§ÙÙÙ» ۧ۳ŰȘŰ ŰąÙ ÙÙ
«ۧÙÙÙ» ۧ۳ŰȘ. ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ÚŻÙŰȘ: Ù
Ù ÙÙ
Û ŰŻŰ§ÙÙ
ŰąÙۏۧ ÚÙ ÚÛŰČÛ Ű§ŰłŰȘŰ Ű§Ù
ۧ ŰšÙ ŰąÛÙ ÙÙ Ù
Û Ű±ŰłÙ
Ű ÙÙ۱ ۳ۚŰČÛ ÙŰłŰȘŰ ŰšŰ§ ۧÛÙ ÙÙŰ±Ű Ù
Ù ŰąÙ ŰąÛÙ Ű±Ű§ Ù
Û ŰšÛÙÙ
Ù Ù
Û ŰȘÙۧÙÙ
ۚ۟ÙۧÙÙ
Ű Ű§Ù
ۧ ŰșÛ۱ ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ÙÙ
Û ŰȘÙۧÙÙ
ۚ۟ÙۧÙÙ
. ŰšÙۧۚ۱ۧÛÙŰ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù Ű§ÛÙ ÙÙÙ
ۧŰȘ Ù ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙ âÙۧ ۱ۧ ÙÙ
Û âŰŻÛŰŻŰ ŰšÙÚ©Ù ŰąÙÚÙ Ù
Û ŰŻÛŰŻŰ ÙŰ±Ű§Û ÙÙŰŽŰȘÙâ Ùۧ ŰšÙŰŻ. ۚۧ ۧÛÙÙÙ Â«Ű§ÙÙÙ»ÙÙ
Ű§Ù Ű§ŰłŰȘ ÙÙ ŰŻŰ± ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ÙŰłŰȘŰ Ű§Ù
ۧ Ú©ÙÙ
Û Ű§ÙÙÙ Ű±Ű§ ۯ۱ ŰŹÙ
ÙÛ Â«Ű±ŰÙ
ۧÙÙÙ» ۯ۱ ÙÙۧÙ
Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰŽÙÛŰŻŰ ÙÙ
Û ŰŻÛŰŻŰ ÙÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ŰąÛÛ ÙŰ±ŰąÙ Ù
Û ŰŻÛŰŻ. Ù
Ù ŰźÙŰŻÙ
ۧÛÙ Ű±Ű§ ۯ۱ ŰąÙ ŰŹÙŰłÙ ŰŻÛŰŻÙ
.
ŰšÙ Ű§ÛÙ ŰȘ۱ŰȘÛŰšŰ Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ک۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ú©Ű§ŰžÙ
ŰšÙ ŰšŰ±Ú©ŰȘ ŰčÙۧÛŰȘÛ Ú©Ù ŰŻŰ±ŰšŰ§Ű±Û Ű§Ù ŰŽŰŻÙ ŰšÙŰŻŰ ŰŻŰ± Ù
ۏۧÙ
Űč ŰčÙÙ
Û ÙÙ
ۯ۱ ŰąÙ ŰČÙ
ۧÙŰ ŰŹŰ§ ۧÙŰȘۧۯ. ۯ۱ ŰÙŰČÙŰ Ù۱ Ù
Ű·ÙŰšÛ ŰšÙ âŰČÙŰŻÛ ÙŸŰ°Û۱ÙŰȘÙ ÙÙ
Û ŰŽÙŰŻŰ Ù۱ÙŰł ۧۯŰčۧÛÛ ÙÙŰŻŰ ŰčÙÙ
ۧ ŰąÙ Ű±Ű§ ۚ۳Ûۧ۱ Ù
Û âŰłÙŰŹÙŰŻ ŰȘۧ ۏۧ ŰšÛۧÙŰȘŰŻŰ Ű§Ù
ۧ ۯۧ۳ŰȘŰ§Ù Ú©Ű±ŰšÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
Ù Ű§ÛÙÚ©Ù ÙۧÙŰčŰ§Ù ÙŰ±ŰąÙ ŰšÙ Ű§Ù ŰčÙۧÛŰȘ ŰŽŰŻÙ Ű§ŰłŰȘŰ ŰŻŰ± Ù
ÛŰ§Ù ŰčÙÙ
ۧ ÙŸŰ°Û۱ÙŰȘÙ ŰŽŰŻ.
Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ŰŰŹŰȘÛ Ű§ŰłŰȘ ŰšŰ±Ű§Û Ú©ŰłŰ§ÙÛ Ú©Ù ŰșÛ۱ ۧŰČ ŰČÙŰŻÚŻÛ ŰžŰ§ÙŰ±Û Ű±Ű§ ÙÙÛ Ù
Û ÙÙÙŰŻ.ÙÙ
ÚÙÛÙ Ù
Ű€Ù
ÙÛÙ Ù ŰčÙÙ
ۧ Ú©Ù Ù
ŰčŰȘÙŰŻÙŰŻ ÙÛŰł ۧÙŰčÙÙ
ŰšÙ۫۱۩ ۧÙŰȘÙÙÙ
ÙۧÙŰȘÙÙÛÙ
Ű ŰšÙ ŰšŰ±Ú©ŰȘ ŰčÙۧÛŰȘÛ Ú©Ù ŰšÙ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŽŰŻŰ Ű§ÛÙ Ù
ŰčÙۧ ۱ۧ ŰšÙ Ű”Ù۱ŰȘ ŰÙ Ű§ÙÛÙÛÙ ŰŻŰ±Ù Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ. Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
Ù۱ۚÙۧÛÛ Ùۧ۞Ù
ۧŰČ Ù۳ۧÙÛ ŰšÙŰŻ ÙÙ ŰšŰ§ŰčŰ« ŰŽŰŻ ۧÙŰ±Ű§ŰŻŰ ŰąÙÚÙ Ű±Ű§ ŰšÙ Ű”Ù۱ŰȘ ŰčÙÙ
ۧÙÛÙÛÙ ŰšŰ§Ù۱ ۯۧێŰȘÙŰŻŰ ŰšÙ Ű”Ù۱ŰȘ ŰÙ Ű§ÙÛÙÛÙ ŰšŰ§Ù۱ Ú©ÙÙŰŻ. ŰšÙۧۚ۱ۧÛÙ Ű§ÛŰŽŰ§Ù ÙÙ
ۚ۱ ŰÙŰČÙ ŰÙ ŰŻŰ§Ű±ŰŻŰ ÙÙ
ۚ۱ ŰčۧÙ
Û Ù
۱ۯÙ
.
Ù
۱ŰÙÙ
ŰąÙŰ§Û ŰłÛŰŻ ۧ۳Ù
ۧŰčÛÙ ŰčÙÙÛ ÙÙÙ Ù
Û Ù۱ۯÙŰŻ ÙÙ ÙŰŹÙŰŻ ۧÛŰŽŰ§Ù ŰŻŰ± Ű§Ű±Ű§Ú©Ű ŰȘŰÙÙÛ ŰŻŰ± ۧÛÙ
Ű§Ù Ù
۱ۯÙ
Ù ŰŹÙۧÙŰ§Ù Ű§Ûۏۧۯ Ù۱ۯ. ۯ۱ ŰąÙ ŰČÙ
ۧÙŰ ŰŹÙŰšÙ âÙۧÛÛ ÙÙ Ù
ÙŰŹŰš ۱ÙÛ âگ۱ۯۧÙÛ ŰŹÙۧÙŰ§Ù Ű§ŰČ ŰŻÛÙ ŰŽÙŰŻŰ ÙÙ
ÙŰšÙŰŻ Ù ŰŹÙŰ§Ù ÙÙگۧÙ
Ù۱ÙŰŻ ŰšÙ ŰŻŰšÛ۱۳ŰȘŰ§Ù Ù ŰŻŰ§ÙێگۧÙŰ ŰšÛâۯ۱ÙÚŻ Ù
Ù۱ۯ ÙŰŹÙ
Û
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